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In this article, Professor Oesterle surveys the prosecutorial response to the
recent corporate scandals and their attendant public pressure. The article
explores a number of shifts in prosecutorial tactics. These include the use of
"easier-to-try" charges that are tangential to the core wrongdoing, greater use of
simultaneous civil prosecutions, threats of prosecution of the corporate entity to
coerce cooperation against employees, and increased involvement of state
prosecutors in financial investigations. Professor Oesterle critically examines
these developments in considering whether they are positive and necessary given
the complexity of these matters or rather an excessive use of government power.
I. INTRODUCTION
The revelations of 2002 established a dubious high water mark in this
country's history of business scandals. Scores of American companies had been
cooking their books. A record 330 publicly-traded companies restated their past
earnings disclosures. One of the restatements triggered the largest single
bankruptcy proceeding the country had ever seen, another the third largest, and yet
another the fourth. The total size of all public companies in bankruptcy set a new
high as well. The odor of scandal covered an entire industry,' the telecom sector,
and permeated its support professionals-lawyers, auditors and accountants,
investment bankers, securities analysts, and securities rating agencies.
Trillions of dollars of capital value, much of it held in retirement funds,
evaporated. A stunned public, and their elected representatives, called for criminal
prosecutions of those responsible.2 Congress passed a new statute, the Sarbanes-
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2 Consider an editorial in USA Today, a paper that is fairly close to its readers, stated:
Law enforcement must do more than seek some restitution for those harmed by
corporate illegality .... Executives and other individuals responsible for
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Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201 et seq., that added new business crimes to
the federal code and higher penalties for old ones. Under heavy public pressure,
prosecutors, both state and federal, responded with investigations. The
investigations have, at the time of this writing, produced a trickle of indictments
and a guilty plea or two from some minor players and one CEO.3
Public officials and prosecutors ask the public to have patience, but one feels
a growing public skepticism over whether top executives responsible for the
scandals will see jail time.4 Also, there is some question as to how many
breaking laws should be aggressively targeted .... Cops can't be in every
executive suite, just as they can't be on every street. So law enforcement works
when it deters bad behavior. If street thugs know that punishment will be swift
and sure, they'll think twice about committing crime. Until corporate
executives and their accountants feel the same, there's little to prevent the next
Enron.
Big Crimes? Maybe. Big Punishment? Not Likely, USA TODAY, Feb. 5, 2002, at 1 IA; see also
Clifton Leaf, Enough Is Enough; White-Collar Criminals: They Lie They Cheat They Steal and
They've Been Getting Away with It for Too Long, FORTUNE, Mar. 18, 2002, at 60 (detailing high
profile scandals of the last ten years and concluding that "suite thugs don't go to jail").
3 As of the writing of this article, the CFO of WorldCom has been charged by the United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York and by the Oklahoma Attorney General, who has also
charged the CEO of WorldCom. Fifteen executives of HealthSouth have pled guilty in an
investigation by the U.S. Attorney in Birmingham, Alabama. The CEO of HealthSouth has yet to be
charged. The CFO of Enron is facing nearly 100 charges in federal court in Houston, Texas; two
former CEOs of Enron have yet to be charged. A former treasurer of Enron pled guilty and was
sentenced to five years in prison. The founder of Adelphia and his sons have been charged and pled
not guilty in federal court in Manhattan. The New York County District Attorney has filed charges
against the CEO and CFO of Tyco and the CEO's trial has begun. The founder of ImClone Systems
pled guilty to a charge of insider trading and is serving eighty-seven months in jail and must pay a
$4.3 million fine. The CEO of Martha Stewart Inc. has been similarly charged and pled not guilty. A
senior investment banker at Credit Suisse First Boston has been charged with obstruction of justice
and is on trial, and a senior broker at Bank of America has been charged with larceny and securities
fraud. See generally Where Recent Trials Stand, USA TODAY, Sept. 29, 2003, at 3B. The only
successful prosecution of a CEO to date is the guilty plea of the former CEO of Rite Aid Corp.,
Martin L. Grass, in federal district court in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. See Mark Scolforo, Rite Aid
Ex-CEO Pleads Guilty, DESERET NEWS, June 18, 2003, at D10.
4 The comments of Lou Dobbs on his well-known talk show are typical. On June 9, 2003, he
noted that:
Seventy executives in all of corporate America have now been criminally
charged, 16 of them from Enron. No one has been sent to jail. It's been 553
days since Enron filed for bankruptcy .... Each night we track the efforts of
the entire justice system, some 93 United States Attorneys in all, to crack down
on corporate wrongdoing. Of the 70 criminal cases we're currently tracking on
our corporate crime scoreboard, well over half the cases are in the hands of
only three prosecutors .... Is it fair to call this a prosecutorial failure? ... Is
there some point at which people are going to become extraordinarily
impatient?
Lou Dobbs Moneyline (CNN television broadcast, June 9, 2003); see also Geoffrey Colvin, Spare the
Rod and Save the Company, FORTUNE, June 9, 2003, at 46 (complaining about the lack of criminal
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convictions are necessary to sate the public's calls for justice. Will a successful
prosecution of either or both of L. Dennis Kozlowski 5and Frank Quattrone 6 do? A
recovering stock market may shorten the public's memory and salve its irritation,
however.
We have seen business scandal before; they seem to come in waves. The last
one was the insider-trading scandal of the 1980s involving Dennis Levine, Michael
Milken, Ivan Boesky and Martin Siegel. But the size of the 2002 debacle dwarfs
many earlier ones, including the Boesky ring. Each wave of scandal brings new
pressures on our criminal justice system, and we learn new lessons, some
unwanted. For example, from the insider-trading scandals of the 1980s we learned
that pleading guilty to specific charges (often with a promise to testify against
others) so as to avoid the risk of conviction for more serious crimes, landed people
in jail for longer terms than those given to people who went to trial. Many of those
who went to trial went free or settled for minor penalties when prosecutors
struggled to prove guilt in the case's complex financial settings.
What new developments have followed the prosecutions of the 2002
scandals? A mid-stream analysis of the prosecutions of those involved in the 2002
business scandals is, of course, premature, but still offers information relevant to
our efforts to use criminal prosecutions in response to business scandals. Several
themes have emerged-some new, some old with new wrinkles. Those discussed
here include: 1) prosecutors' use of sideshow charges; 2) the civil/criminal choice;
3) the federal/state competition in prosecutions; and 4) prosecutors' use of business
defendants' Achilles heel, reputation, to extract "cooperation." All four
developments reveal a criminal justice system evolving, some say struggling, to
ease the difficulty of successfully prosecuting complex financial frauds; at issue is
whether the changes are beneficial or problematic. Moreover, all the
developments involve significant elevations of prosecutorial power without a
corresponding increase in systems of prosecutorial accountability; the effectiveness
of existing systems of control will be tested.
charges over the WorldCom fraud: "[N]o bad guys have gone to jail yet. If the feds want credibility
with investors and the public, they need to put some perps behind bars."); Leaf, supra note 2, at 60.
5 Mr. Kozlowski was the high profile CEO of Tyco, well known for his lavish lifestyle. He
once held a now infamous $2 million birthday party for his wife in Sardinia.
6 Frank Quattrone, an employee of Credit Suisse First Boston, was the most powerful
dealmaker in the internet boom.
7 John Mulheren faced trial based on testimony from Mr. Boesky. Mulheren's conviction for
stock parking was overturned on appeal.
20041
446 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 1:443
II. PROSECUTORS' USE OF SIDESHOW CHARGES
Prosecutors investigating financial business scandals face a daunting task.
These are high-risk cases. The scandals are complex, involve many individuals,
and the defendants are wealthy and, generally, clever.
8
The complexity of the cases has a variety of consequences. First, the
government investigation and trial will be long and expensive and necessarily
involve the use of high-priced experts. Second, the defense can usually out spend
the prosecution by several orders of magnitude, hiring very skillful lawyers, many
of whom were once very able prosecutors, and their own, very persuasive,
experts. 9 Third, the jury (or judge) may be overwhelmed by the facts. We are
asking ordinary citizens to understand and keep in their heads multi-step,
convoluted business transactions. Finally, it is invariably very difficult to assign
individual fault. These scams are group endeavors, with the involvement of
several people at several layers in a hierarchy. Some are following orders, some
are responsible, and sorting out who is who under a high standard of proof can be
daunting.
8 For a general discussion, see Damien Cave, Lock Up the Analysts and Throw Away the Key,
SALON, May 20, 2002, at http://www.salon.com.
9 See Cave, supra note 8 (discussing the comments of Henry Pontell, criminologist at the
University of California at Irvine). Consider the following exchange between Lou Dobbs and Jeffrey
Toobin, CNN Legal Analyst on Lou Dobbs' talk show, supra note 4:
Toobin: [E]ven when you have these flagrant disasters, Enron, WorldCom,
Tyco, it's very tough to complete the process, get people actually in jail ....
[A]s you show in your scorecard every night, zero people are in jail from those
companies, and it's been 500-plus days since Enron declared bankruptcy.
Dobbs: Is it fair to call this a prosecutorial failure?
Toobin: I think that we're not quite there yet to say it's failure. Certainly, it
demonstrates that when it comes to white-collar crime it's a very slow process,
and no one has figured out a way to speed it up very well.
Dobbs: Isn't there a learning curve that should get a little less steep?
Toobin: But when you realize that the standard is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and you're talking about executives who are insulated by several layers
of other executives, you know, who have lawyers all around them, you're
talking about thousands of documents, simply to accumulate the documents, to
look for the wrongdoing, it takes a long time.
Dobbs: Are lawyers out-gunned, out financed, out resourced?
Toobin: There's certainly an element of that. You have, I mean, tremendous
legal resources on the other side, and essentially unlimited. Defense lawyers
are fond of pointing out that the government has unlimited resources, which in
theory they do. But in fact, you know, these U.S. Attorneys, they're not just
responsible for prosecuting Enron. They have all the federal crimes in their
jurisdiction to prosecute with, you know, a few dozen lawyers. And yes, there
is an outgunning that goes on in these big white-collar cases.
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These and other factors add up to making prosecutions of business scandals
very expensive with a marginal probability of success.' ° Prosecutors can spend
most of their budget and time, over an extended period, on one case, only to lose or
to otherwise achieve marginal results. Heavy investment in negative or marginal
returns is not good for a prosecutor's morale, nor her career."
Even if a case is won, it may be years after the fact. The prosecutors suffer
through the public's impatience only to find that the public has forgotten about the
case when the verdict appears three or four years later.
Prosecutors' natural response is to favor cases in which investigations are
completed quickly and without trial. 12 It is not a new story. Known as "working
up the ladder"' 3 or the "domino game,"'14 the strategy is straightforward: find a
10 "In high-profile cases, perhaps the only thing worse than not bringing the case is bringing the
case and losing .... It may well be that the public, or the press, or the politicians, are absolutely
certain who the bad guys are and certain they should be severely punished. But a moral certainty is
not a substitute for having evidence." Ann Davis, Enron Heat Descends on Smaller Players: Others
Enjoy Shade, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2003, at C1, CI1 (comments of David Becker, former general
counsel of the SEC and now a lawyer in Washington, discussing the problems of trying complex
financial swindles before a jury).
" See Cave, supra note 8 (comments of Henry Pontell):
Prosecutors must have a firm grasp not just of the law but also of high finance,
and they must be willing to fight a well-heeled defendant who can drag out the
case. So when a U.S. attorney can bust, say, three prostitution rings in the same
time it takes to prosecute one person accused of insider trading, it shouldn't
come as a surprise that many prosecutors decide not to bother with the latter.
"They only go after the biggest and best cases," Pontell says. "Why else would
a prosecutor waste their scarce resources on something with an uncertain
outcome? They have to show convictions."
For a discussion of prosecutors' motives, see Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors
Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 259 (2000)
(noting, among other things, that the decision to prosecute is often influenced by prosecutors' interest
in running for higher office); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REv. 505, 533-39 (2001) (prosecutors respond to public desires). Cf J. Mark Ramseyer &
Eric B. Rasmusen, Why is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (2001).
12 See Stuntz, supra note 11, at 538.
13 See, e.g., Mary Flood & Tom Fowler, The Fall of Enron: Task Force Paces Itselffor Results;
Enron Probe Got Pleas Via Tenacity, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 11, 2002, at 1 (noting that Enron Task
Force is working up the chain of command); The News with Brian Williams (CNBC television
broadcast, Aug. 21, 2002) (interview of Richard Mintz by Forrest Sawyer). Mintz, a former
prosecutor, described the Enron investigation at the time of the Michael Kopper plea in the following
terms:
Sawyer: Robert, you're a former federal prosecutor. You know how the game
works. You put the squeeze on one guy, and then you try to work your way up
the ladder. That's clearly what they're doing here, right?
Mintz: That's exactly right. They're following the well-worn path that
prosecutors always use in these types of sophisticated, complex financial fraud
cases, which is to find somebody who is vulnerable, find somebody who has
got some serious criminal liability, but who also has an insider's view and can
2004] 447
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
canary; offer the canary immunity or some other deal (a reduced sentence); 5 and
use the canary's testimony and a hot document or two to convince successively
higher ranking executives that a plea agreement will reduce their jail time.16 An
indignant judge accepting the plea lectures the violator, gives the maximum
sentence allowable under the plea bargain, and it makes the news. 17  Most are
satisfied, except those pundits that compare the sentence with a more lengthy jail
term received by a petty con artist in a contemporaneous prosecution. 18
take the government's hand and literally lead them through the complex series
of financial transactions.
Id. Another common tactic is to use threats of charges against family members as leverage against
the primary target of the investigation in plea negotiations. See Flood & Fowler, supra, at 1
(describing the Enron Task Force's pressure on both Fastow and Kopper through threats of
prosecution against their wives and domestic partners). The charges against Mrs. Fastow, failure to
report kickbacks received from participants in the fraudulent transactions, are also an example of a
sideshow prosecution. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Enron and the System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at
A19 (case is a "fluke"; "system is [not] working").
14 Mark Curriden, Domino Effect Could Lead to Series of Enron Pleas; Anderson Deal
Expected to Spur Insiders to Talk with Prosecutors, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 12, 2002, at ID.
15 See, e.g., Henny Sender & Gregory Zuckerman, Investment Tips: Behind the Mutual-Fund
Probe: Three Informants Opened Up, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2003, at Al (describing how the New
York Attorney General's office broke the 2003 mutual fund scandal).
16 See Special Report, Trial and Error-American Companies, ECONOMIST, June 22, 2002, at 2
(commenting on then United States Attorney Rudolph Guiliani's use of Dennis Levine to get Martin
Siegel, the use of Siegel to get Ivan Boesky, and the use of Boesky to get the "biggest fish," Michael
Milken). Recently, Department of Justice prosecutors announced a deal with a division chief in
Enron, Michael Kopper. In exchange for cooperation in the investigation, prosecutors agreed to
accept a guilty plea entailing a criminal penalty of $4.3 million and a maximum prison sentence of
ten years in jail. See Kurt Eichenwald, Former Enron Executive Pleads Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
2002, at Cl. His cooperation could sweep up a large number of former Enron executives, creating a
stable of potential cooperating witnesses. Id.; see also Today (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 21,
2002) (interview with Jim Stewart by Campbell Brown) (discussing the Kopper plea as "a classic
prosecutor strategy to work your way up the food chain, to find a witness lower down who knows a
lot about what went on, get him to plead guilty, and then tell what he knows about others on the food
chain."). A similar strategy is at work in the case against Qwest and HealthSouth senior executives.
See Barnaby J. Feder, US. Takes Dual Actions in Qwest Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2003, at Cl;
Kurt Eichenwald, Key Executive at HealthSouth Admits to Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at Cl.
17 A recent example is the judge's sentencing of Samuel D. Waksal, founder and former chief
executive of ImClone Systems, to the maximum jail sentence on his plea bargain-seven years and
three months-and a fine of several million dollars. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Seglin, The Jail Threat is
Real. So, Will Executives Behave?, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2003, at BU4. The term exceeded the
combined sentences of the 1980s stock swindlers Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken. The federal
judge scolded Waksal for his "lawlessness and arrogance." The judge told Waksal that "[t]he harm
you wrought is truly incalculable." Id.
18 See Cave, supra note 8. Those convicted of crimes for the savings and loan scandal in the
1980s, at the time one of the costliest financial crimes in the country's history, spent an average time
of 36.4 months in jail. Michael Milken, the target of the insider trading scandal prosecution in the
1980s, spent only 22 months in jail. Moreover, white-collar criminals of the early nineties could
expect to serve their time at minimum-security prisons or halfway houses. By comparison, professor
of criminology, Henry Pontell, at the University of California at Irvine, found that a burglar who
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Cases that do not fit the pattern because they are too complex and the defense
too formidable are likely to be quietly dropped after several years of investigation.
But this is also old news. What is new is the increasing use of sideshow
prosecutions by prosecutors to sidestep the problem. A sideshow prosecution is
one in which the main actors in a very public scandal are indicted not on the
essence of the scandal itself but on some other less serious, discrete violations of
law that have come to the prosecutor's attention during the scandal investigation. 19
The charges made are easier to prove than charges based on the actual, suspected
steals $300 or less goes to jail for 55.6 months and first-time drug offenders suffer an average of 64.9
months of jail time. See generally KITTY CALAVITA ET AL., BIG MONEY CRIME: FRAUD AND POLITICS
IN THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS (1997) (comparing sentences received by major players in the
savings and loan scandal a decade ago with the sentences handed to other types of nonviolent federal
offenders).
Times may have changed, however. The increased sentences will land white-collar criminals in
more severe prison conditions. See Jayne O'Donnell & Richard Willing, Prison Time Gets Harder
For White-Collar Crooks, USA TODAY, May 12, 2003, at IA; Ted Landphair, U.S. Giving Tougher
Sentences to White Collar Criminals, VOICE OF AM. NEWS, May 31, 2003 (describing the United
States Justice Department's policy of asking for longer sentences and reporting on John Rusnak and
Robert Brennan, who each received seven-plus years in medium security prisons).
19 Prosecutions based on mail or wire fraud statutes may also be sideshow prosecutions. On the
other hand, these statutes present another problem, the creeping criminalization of civil violations.
Over the past 130 years, prosecutors have used mail and wire fraud statutes to criminalize an
increasing broad array of frauds. See generally Shani S. Kennedy & Rachel Price Flum, Mail and
Wire Fraud, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 817 (2002) (mail and wire fraud statutes used as a first line of
defense or stopgap device, permitting the prosecution of newly invented frauds until Congress enacts
particularized legislation). See also Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal
Fraud. The Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435 (1995); Geraldine Szott
Moohr, Mail Fraud Meets Criminal Theory, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1998); Frank P. Andreano, The
Evolution of Federal Computer Crime Policy: The Ad Hoc Approach to an Ever-Changing Problem,
27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 81 (1999). The use of mail and wire fraud charges to police corporate fiduciary
obligations of officers and directors is controversial. See .Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers,
Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42
DuKE L.J. 945, 954-57 (1993); Peter R. Ezersky, Note, Intra-Corporate Mail and Wire Fraud:
Criminal Liability for Fiduciary Breach, 94 YALE L.J. 1427 (1985). Most of the critics decry the
breadth of the charges, arguing that prosecutors use the statutes to enforce essentially contractual
duties without proof of loss or causation. See Winter, supra, at 956. Some of the criticisms are
similar to those against sideshow prosecutions, however:
Since the ultimate object of any investigation is indictment and either plea or
trial, federal prosecutors frequently will bring a case relatively unrelated to
whatever they originally were pursuing, simply because it is an indictable,
triable case. The federal agents who work under the prosecutors also are
anxious to turn investigations into actual prosecutions. They. may press the
prosecutor for indictment of whatever offenses appear to be indictable, even if
those offenses have little relation to the initial investigation or involve lesser
targets or less serious conduct than originally anticipated.
Ezersky, supra, at 1441 (citing Daniel J. Hurson, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute-A
Legislative Approach, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 423, 433 (1983)). In other words, prosecutors can use mail
and wire fraud charges to bring sideshow prosecutions; they are another potential tool to do so.
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offense, are less complicated for juries, and can carry significant jail sentences as
penalties.
Prosecutors' investigations of the main scandal often uncover several smaller
violations committed by the targets of the inquiry. These violations of tax law or
document retention are sideshows to the main scandal (which in 2002 was usually
some form of lying about financial performance), but are discrete acts and easy to
prove at trial.2° Prosecutors can get immediate results at little cost and low risk
and attack the targets of the public's anger to boot. On sentencing, the greater
scandal may, and often does, have some impact on the severity of the penalty.
Finally, and this is an unfortunate claim if true, some argue that the courts will
21
relax the standards of proof to convict a "big tuna" in such cases.
These sideshow prosecutions are not completely new. 2 They have a long
history. 23 Al Capone went to prison for the rest of his life on tax evasion
charges-he did not declare the revenue received from a greyhound racetrack in
Florida.2 4 He was never sentenced for his organized crime activity-the murders,
bribery, and illegal trafficking in illicit or stolen goods.25 But in the past such
20 A relative of the tactic, and more defensible perhaps, is when prosecutors take on small
transactions in a complex financial fraud case and try the case on the transactions. See, e.g., Davis,
supra note 10, at Cl, Cll (noting that Enron prosecutors are focusing on a "Nigerian barge
investment" transaction to convict Andrew Fastow, the Enron CEO for his part in the mammoth
Enron financial scandal revealed in 2002; the barge deal boosted Enron's earnings by only $12
million-peanuts); see also Kris Hudson, Qwest May Hear from Feds Today, DENVER POST, Dec. 4,
2003, at A l (discussing the criminal trial of four executives of Qwest for overstated revenues claimed
on a single transaction with the Arizona School Facilities Board).
21 See Susan B. Bodell, Catching "Big Tuna": How the Seventh Circuit Finally Reeled in
Anthony Accardo, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1061 (1993); see also Linda S. Eads, From Capone to
Boesky: Tax Evasion, Insider Trading and Problems of Proof 79 CAL. L. REV. 1421 (1991).
22 See Special Report, supra note 16 (commenting on "indirect prosecutions" in the United
States).
23 Another example, perhaps, is the indictment of the Chairman of the NYSE in 1962, J.
Truman Bidwell, on income-tax evasion charges. Mr. Bidwell was acquitted, but censored by the
Exchange for giving large gifts without the NYSE board's permission. See Randall Smith, Courts
Face Biggest Corporate Cases in Years: Former CSFB Banker Quattrone Recalls Excesses of Tech
Bubble; Trial Hinges on a Single E-Mail, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2003, at Cl.
24 For a description of the Capone case, see Eads, supra note 21. The IRS in the 30s and 40s
was also involved in other high-profile cases: the investigation of the Lindbergh kidnapping, the
prosecution of Huey Lond, the Pendergast organization, and the conviction of Irving Wexler (a.k.a.
"Waxie Gordon"). See ALAN HYND, THE GIANT KILLERS 12-13 (1945).
25 Chicago boss Anthony Accardo had a similar history. See Bodell, supra note 21. The
reputed heir to Al Capone's organized crime syndicate in Chicago, he was a brutal man, his weapon
of choice was a baseball bat, "Joe Batters." Known as the "Enforcer" and allegedly a trigger man in
the St. Valentine's Day Massacre in 1929, he was a principal player in the War of Sicilian Succession
in Chicago in the 1930s. He was arrested twenty-seven times on charges of carrying a concealed
weapon, gambling, extortion, kidnapping and murder. The closest the authorities came to convicting
him was on a charge of filing false tax returns. The Seventh Circuit reversed his jury conviction,
citing prejudicial publicity during the trial. He died of natural causes in 1992 at the age of eighty-six
and never spent a night in jail.
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prosecutions seemed to be less frequent, and there was an air of regret about such
practices.26 At minimum, they seemed confined to a steady trickle of tax evasion
charges.27 No longer.
Prosecutors in complex business scandal cases now seem quite content to turn
to sideshow prosecutions very quickly in order to sate public pressure for justice
and to avoid the high risks of a main show prosecution. Not only has the
frequency of such charges increased, but the types of charges prosecutors use have
blossomed from tax evasion to, naming just a few, mail and wire fraud, stock
parking and other technical disclosure violations,28 money laundering, 29 and, the
new favorite, obstruction of justice (lying to prosecutors or shredding evidence are
examples).30 There appears to be a new cultural acceptance of the practice.31
26 The "stock parking" convictions, often overturned on appeal, seemed to this marginal
observer to mark a turning point. See, e.g., United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir.
1991). See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Meaning of Mulheren, N.Y. L.J., July 25, 1991, at 5;
John C. Coffee, Jr., Developing Law on Stock Parking, Bidder Disclosure, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 11, 1989,
at 39 [hereinafter Coffee, Developing Law]. The most sensational of the "stock parking" cases was
the prosecution of Drexel Burnham Lambert and its star employee, Michael Milken. See DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY MICHAEL MILKEN AND His FINANCIAL
REVOLUTION (1995). Drexel pled guilty and paid a $650 million penalty; Milken settled the
government's criminal and civil charges, paying over $2 billion and serving slightly less than 2 years
of a 10-year prison sentence.
27 See Eads, supra note 21, at 1427 n.16.
28 Technical disclosure violations are to be distinguished from disclosure violations that go to
the heart of the scandal, which is often a scheme that involves lying to the public investors about a
firm's financial condition. Technical disclosure violations include violations of disclosure
obligations that do not go to the heart of the scandal but are minor violations of disclosure provisions.
Stock parking, for example, is a failure to disclosure ownership of stock held in other companies
when required by federal rules. See Coffee, Developing Law, supra note 26, at 39. Prosecutors bring
stock parking cases over the more serious, but harder to prove, insider trading charges that are the
basis of the wrongdoing.
29 Federal prosecutors formally charged Enron CFO Andrew Fastow with securities fraud, wire
fraud, mail fraud, bank fraud, conspiracy, and money laundering. The money laundering charge
caught the attention of some reporters. See Joseph McCafferty, Laundry Time, CFO MAG., Nov.
2002, available at http://www.economist.com ("Isn't it usually reserved for big-time drug dealers?").
The laundering charge is based on the allegation that Fastow used his ill-gotten gains to make
legitimate purchases, including a home. Id. The charge carries a maximum sentence of twenty years.
30 So long as the government can charge more than one underlying violation and meet the other
elements of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, it can, and routinely
does, include a charge of racketeering. See J. Bradley Bennett, White Collar Crime, Blue Collar
Tactics: A Defense Lawyer's Perspective, 28 W. ST. U. L. REv. 65, 83 (2000-2001). The
Department of Justice Manual encourages the use of racketeering charges to obtain more severe jail
sentences. The Department of Justice Manual § 9-110.310(2) (2d ed. 2001).
31 There are, of course, examples of prosecutors proceeding with some of the complex cases.
Two former Tyco International executives are on trial in state court in New York on allegations of
looting $600 million from the company; the founding family of Adelphia Communications
Corporation goes on trial in federal court early next year facing charges of financial fraud in the
collapse of their company.
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There are several prominent examples of sideshow prosecutions in the last
two years. First, consider the case of Frank Quattrone.32 He was one of Silicone
Valley's most influential investment bankers during the technology stock boom of
the 1990s. Mr. Quattrone ran the technology banking business at CSFB, a unit of
Credit Suisse Group. Mr. Quattrone and CSFB were lead underwriters in more
tech-stock IPOs than any other firm on Wall Street. We now know that there were
serious problems in many of those IPOs: underwriters sought and received various
forms of illegal kickbacks in exchange for favorable allocations of "hot" issues.
33
The charge? The United States Attorney in Manhattan charged Mr. Quattrone with
obstruction of justice and witness tampering for a single e-mail. Mr. Quattrone
forwarded to his entire department a subordinate's e-mail advising that CSFB
"clean up those files., 34  The charges do not carry large potential fines and, at
most, one to two years of jail time.
Second, consider the case that has been material for many a late-night comedy
monologue, Martha Stewart. Ms. Stewart, founder of Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia Inc. allegedly traded ImClone stock on an illegal tip of insider
information. The charge? On June 3rd she was indicted for perjury and
obstruction of justice, not insider trading. As noted in the Wall Street Journal,
"[i]n many cases, it can be easier to demonstrate a coverup than the underlying
crime. 35 Often overlooked in the public discussion of the case is that the SEC has
32 See Smith, supra note 23, at CI, C10.
33 CSFB paid $100 million to settle charges arising from an investigation by the SEC and the
NASD that the bank obtained excessive commissions from about 100 hedge funds in exchange for
allocations of IPO stock.
34 He had received a briefing on an SEC investigation into his firm's IPO activities two days
earlier. His lawyers will argue that the e-mail refers only to investment banking documents and not
those kept by the firm's traders and capital market executives who oversaw the firm's IPO activities.
35 Mark Maremont, In Corporate Crime, Paper Trail Leads to Ink Analyst's Door, WALL ST. J.,
July 1, 2003, at Al. The financial press is focusing on an aspect of the Martha Stewart indictment
that is not what I would call a sideshow prosecution. See Kudlow & Cramer (CNBC television
broadcast, Jan. 14, 2003) (comments of Larry Kudlow in an interview with well-known trial attorney
David Boies). The indictment charges Ms. Stewart with securities fraud for declaring her innocence
to an allegation of insider trading, and thereby, temporarily buoying the stock price of her namesake
company. Troubling to the commentators is whether one's public proclamation of innocence should
itself be fraud. See David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Flunking the Martha Test, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16,
2004, at A10 (arguing no; the authors teach a course on White Collar Crime at the Stanford Law
School.) While an intriguing question, and it is discussed below, it is not a sideshow prosecution
because to prove the claim, prosecutors must establish the basic charge of financial fraud-in this
case that she was guilty of financial fraud-for the public denial to be fraudulent. The charge is
better subcategorized under another prosecutor's tactic, that of "piling-on." In "piling-on" a
prosecutor subdivides a basic charge of financial fraud into numerous charges so as to increase the
offender's exposure to a lengthy sentence and encourage a plea bargain. Prosecutors also commonly
use mail and wire fraud charges to "pile-on." Moreover, the many charges increase a prosecutor's
flexibility in negotiating tailor-made plea agreements. Andrew Fastow, the Enron CFO, was, for
example, charged with ninety-eight counts of various forms of financial fraud. He pled guilty to two.
See Kurt Eichenwald, Ex-Chief Financial Officer of Enron and Wife Plead Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan
15, 2004, at C9.
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charged Ms. Stewart in a companion civil proceeding with insider trading; it is
running concurrent with the criminal prosecution.36 She is, in a sense, "answering"
for the basic offense of insider trading.
The third example is, perhaps, the most dramatic. Arthur Andersen, the
notorious auditor of Enron and WorldCom, was convicted by a jury on June 15,
2002 of obstruction of justice, a charge only tangentially related to the holes in
Enron's financial statements and not at all related to Andersen's real offence of
undermining financial markets by publishing misleading information. Andersen
was ultimately fined a paltry $500,000, the maximum for the charge.3 7 Yet, the
prosecution damaged Andersen's credibility so severely that the firm, one of the
largest and most successful accounting firms in the world, closed its doors. 38 The
36 See infra note 67.
37 Mary Flood & Tom Fowler, Enron's Auditor Is Given the Max, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 17,
2002, at Al.
38 See Peter V. Letsou, Why Kill Andersen?, DAILY DEAL, Apr. 23, 2002 (Andersen was the
auditor for more then 2,300 publicly traded companies, roughly 17% of the nation's total). Eliot
Spitzer, the New York State Attorney General, later noted that he thought criminal charges against
Andersen had been a mistake and refused to bring such charges against Merrill Lynch. See James
Leynse, Straight Talk for Eliot Spitzer: The New York AG on the Mutual Fund Investigation and
Other Issues, Bus. WK., Oct. 6, 2003, at 129-30:
The consequence of indicting Arthur Andersen was we went from five major
accounting firms to four, and 60,000 people were thrown out of work. The
indictment was predicated on destruction-of-evidence charges. That
destruction of evidence was criminal. However, there was no corporate-wide
policy to destroy evidence. Therefore, I felt that if you're going to indict the
entire company and destroy the company, do it for a policy that went to the
core of the business.
Eric Holder, former deputy attorney general in the Clinton administration and author of the Holder
Memorandum, defended the decision in classic sideshow prosecution terms:
Holder: One of the factors that weighed heavily in favor of the Andersen
indictment was the fact that it was a recidivist corporation. It had problems in
its interaction with Waste Management some years before.
Montagne: Would a better indictment have focused on Arthur Andersen's
accounting practices, or some version of fraud possibly, which of course is its
core business?
Holder: Yeah. That would have been a better indictment. Now the question, of
course, is can you come up with the proof in order to come up with an
indictment that would survive the challenge and be one that would convince a
jury to convict the corporation. Yeah, but I mean, technically, that would be a
better indictment, because it goes more to the core of what the corporation
does.
Montagne: What is the benefit of indicting the company along with company
officials?
Holder: Well, you hold a corporation responsible when a corporation has, as a
matter of business decision, decided that it's going to conduct itself in a certain
way. You send a message to the rest of the industry so that you have change,
hopefully not only in the corporation, but within the industry itself.
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Andersen prosecutorial success, moreover, came with its own warning. Even
though the Andersen partner in charge of the Enron audit had pled guilty and
agreed to testify for the government, subsequent statements by the jurors reveal
that the government nearly lost the case. 39  Even the sideshow prosecutions of
financial crimes can be difficult.
40
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, -prompted by the corporate scandals
revealed in that year, increased substantially the penalties for, among other things,
you guessed it, mail and wire fraud, all disclosure violations, and obstruction of
justice. 4' The penalties for mail and wire fraud were increased by 400%;
obstruction of justice penalties increased 200%.42 Moreover, the Act adds two new
crimes that a prosecutor could use in sideshow prosecutions: CEO and CFO
personal certifications of financial reports4 3  and retaliation against
Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast, July 31, 2002) (Interview of Eric Holder by Renee
Montagne) (note his use of the word "technically"). Later in the interview Holder took a position
against any indictment in the Worldcom case, arguing that the collateral consequences would be too
substantial. Id. ("If it were to be indicted, it would not be able to get government contracts. It might
affect its ability to come out of bankruptcy and pay off shareholders, and obviously have a negative
impact on the employees of the corporation.")
39 See Special Report, supra note 16.
40 Federal prosecutors did have another notable recent success. In early October 2003, a jury in
federal court in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, convicted Rite Aid Corporation's former general counsel
of obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and other charges related to a $1.6 billion accounting
fraud in the company. See Rite Aid Ex-Counsel is Convicted: Guilty Verdict Marks First of
Corporate Scandals by a Jury in Current Crop, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2003, at C8.
41 The Act increases by four times the maximum penalty for mail and wire fraud, from five to
twenty years in prison. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 903, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1343 (2003)
[hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act]. The Act also sets the penalty for conspiracy and attempt to
commit fraud as the same as the penalty for the underlying fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1349. The Act
doubled the penalty for securities fraud from ten to twenty years in prison and increased maximum
fines from $1 million to $5 million. 15 U.S.C. §78ff(a). In the Act, Congress added three new laws
prohibiting conduct that undermines a government investigation. Violations for the three crimes
doubled the penalties of pre-Act obstruction charges from ten years to twenty years in prison. 18
U.S.C. §§ 1519, 1512(c)(1), 1520(b).
42 The Act also mandates the review and, when appropriate, amendment of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for obstruction of justice and criminal fraud, the new criminal provisions of
the Act, and securities fraud offenses. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 805, 905, 1101. When the new
Guidelines are promulgated they will contain increased sentences for white-collar criminals whose
activities create substantial economic losses. The Sentencing Commission has issued temporary
guidelines that raise penalties for frauds involving large sums of money and has called for comments.
See Eric Lichtblau, Panel Clears Harsher Terms in Corporate Crime Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2002, at Cl. The Justice Department has criticized the new guidelines in that they do not provide for
a more comprehensive overall increase in penalties for all types of fraud. See Eric Lichtblau, Bush
Officials Vowing to Seek Tough Penalties in Wall St. Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at C 1.
43 An executive who knowingly certifies financial statements that do not fairly present the
firm's financial condition is subject to a maximum fine of $1 million and a prison term of ten years.
If an executive acts willfully, the maximum penalties are increased to $5 million and twenty years in
prison. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 906. Whether a certification case is a sideshow prosecution or an
attack on the core fraud will depend on the prosecutor's choice of errors in the financial reports. The
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whistleblowers. 44 The severity of the maximum prison terms authorized in the
Act, averaging twenty years, are comparable to those levied for attempted murder,
torture, and sexual abuse of a minor.45
Critics of the new penalties question whether raising prison terms will have
any effect on business conduct.46 (In this regard, the Act will be a new focal point
for the old argument between the opposing camps of the deterrence and retribution
theorists,47 because the Act is a clear victory for those who believe that the
criminal law should exact retribution.) Others charge that the legislation was mere
"political pandering" to the public outrage48 because most of the crimes created by
the Act were already crimes under earlier legislation.49 The critics may be right,
prosecution of the executives of HealthSouth for violating the certification provision is not a
sideshow prosecution, for example.
44 Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 806, 1107. Executives who knowingly and intentionally retaliate
against whistleblowers are subject to criminal fines and a maximum penalty of ten years in prison.
The new crime does not deal with the underlying criminal behavior, nor financial fraud, but instead
its aftermath and attempts to cover it up.
45 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in
Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REv. 937, 954 n. 112 (2003).
46 See id. at 955 (collecting authorities and citing a former SEC official: "If they're willing to
risk five years, they're going to risk [ten] years."). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act will, no doubt, dismay
law and economics commentators, known as "optimal penalty theorists," who have argued for two
decades that criminal fines can create the same deterrent as jail sentences and at a lower cost. See,
e.g., Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 409,
410 (1980); see also Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of
Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U. L. REv. 395 (1991).
47 See, e.g., Jennifer S. Recine, Examination of the White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1535, 1567-68 (2002) (using retributive theory to
support the act):
The retributive theory of punishment is that punishment, in whatever form,
should be imposed because it is "morally fitting that a person who does wrong
should suffer in proportion to wrongdoing." By contrast, the utilitarian view is
that punishment is only justifiable where its outcome has a favorable impact on
society . . . . This new law creates the possibility that when a CEO defrauds
employees, investors and the government-causing catastrophic losses-that
CEO will face a sentence that reflects the enormity of the damage his actions
have wrought.
48 See Stephen Labaton, Handcuffs Make Strange Politics, You Say? But Not In Washington,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at Cl (describing the public backlash's effect on Congress and the
President); see also Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 Hous.
L. REv. 1, 46 (2003) (describing the rushed nature of the legislation).
49 See, e.g., Moohr, supra note 45, at 951, 955-56:
The criminal charges brought thus far against Enron executives demonstrate
that there was no scarcity of criminal laws "on the books."... [L]ongstanding
federal criminal laws, substantial penalties, and increased certainty of
punishment did not deter serious business misconduct at an astonishing number
of corporations. Wrongdoers were not deterred by the possibility of contact
with the criminal justice system's enforcement agents and mechanisms-
judges, prosecutors, police officers, courtrooms, fingerprinting, perp walks, and
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but they have missed the point of the Act. The increased prison terms on a
multiplicity of indictable charges will make sideshow prosecutions more tempting
to prosecutors and, more importantly, will signal a Congressional acceptance and
encouragement of the practice.
Moreover, prosecutors' justifications for sideshow prosecutions seem to have
diversified. The old, and still very healthy, justification is that such prosecutions
are like a shoestring tackle on the one-yard line; prosecutors must use them to put
very bad people behind bars when there is insufficient evidence to otherwise
convict them of their core offenses. The new justification, fueled by academic
literature on "cooperation," '5 is that such prosecutions aid the prosecutor's overall
effort to secure effective cooperation (in exchange for leniency) from those who
are under investigation. To a prosecutor, Martha Stewart was much more than an
inside trader; she obstructed their investigation. By making an example out of her,
future targets of investigations will be more likely to cooperate and less likely to
resist.
One can view the development of sideshow prosecutions as inevitable and,
perhaps, even healthy given the constraints of a prosecutor's budget, 51 but there is
a cost-we lose the public trial, and with it the revelation and condemnation of the
core corrupt business practices that attracted the public's ire and the prosecutors'
attention.52 To some, sideshow charges look like what they are: an end-run around
the more difficult to prove, yet suspected (and hyped), actual offense.53 There has
been some negative comment. The following is typical talk-show comment on the
charge against Martha Stewart: "And it just sticks in one's craw that she's being
bail hearings. Nor were they deterred by the stigma and societal condemnation
that attaches to a felony conviction or even to an indictment.... This evidence
suggests that penal sanctions alone will not prevent future Enrons.
50 See infra text accompanying note 146.
51 One could argue that they are preferable to no prosecutions at all. See Leaf, supra note 2, at
68 (describing the research of Professor Susan Long at Syracuse University). In a ten-year period
from 1992 to 2001, the SEC referred 609 cases to the Justice Department for possible criminal
charges, only sixty or so a year. United States Attorneys declined to prosecute in 64% of the cases
and obtained guilty verdicts in 76% of the 36% of the cases in which they did prosecute. Only
eighty-seven defendants spent a day in jail.
52 Critics could also note the heavy reliance on prosecutors' case-by-case judgment and the
increased variability of treatment given offenders. It would also be difficult to implement a
"maximum penalty" direction from the United States Attorney General. See Eric Lichtblau, Ashcroft
Limiting Prosecutors Use of Plea Bargains, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2003, at Al (detailing a
controversial policy directive issued by Attorney General Ashcroft instructing U.S. Attorneys to
"seek the most serious charges possible in all cases").
53 An extraordinary example of a sideshow prosecution comes from the military. The military
recently arrested Capt. James Yee, a Muslim chaplain who ministered to the 600 or so prisoners at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The government charged him with espionage. When the spy case
crumbled, the government charged him with adultery and keeping pornography on his government-
owned computer. See Robyn Blumner, Adultery Charge in Military Case is Hypocritical, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Dec. 15, 2003, at A9 ("It is simply not fair or valid to single out Yee for an adultery
charge when the list of military transgressors is probably longer than the contrail on a B-52.").
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prosecuted for lying about a crime that she was not charged with. It's like they
went around the back door because they couldn't find the actual case against
her., 54 William Safire, writing in The New York Times also questioned whether a
protestation of innocence, not made under oath, should be transformed into a
charge of "materially misleading federal investigators."
Stewart... dared to tell an investors' conference that her sale of
stock was perfectly legal and that she was cooperating with
investigators. She also proclaimed her innocence in some detail
to the Wall Street Journal.
That, charges the government, was a crime. Although common
sense suggests that mounting a public defense is the natural thing
to do for a person being anonymously smeared, the prosecutor
reads a sinister motive into her speaking out: She was not trying
to salvage her personal reputation but was instead pumping up
the price of her company's stock....
Even a world-famous "domestic diva". . . is entitled to act like a
jerk on occasion without risking a charge of criminal conspiracy.
The message this selective prosecution is sending executives is
not "don't lie"; rather it is: Don't explain your side to investors
or the media lest it land you in court for manipulating your stock.
Wrong message.55
Moreover, prosecutors can lose these cases as well. The hung jury in the
Quattrone case demonstrates that jurors may reject even very basic allegations of
financial misbehavior. 6 A Wall Street Journal story, after the trial noted:
54 Late Edition (CNN television broadcast, June 15, 2003) (interview of Mickey Sherman by
Wolf Blitzer).
5 William Safire, Fight Back; Fight Back, Martha, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2003, at 21A; see also
Paul Craig Roberts, A Comedy of Injustice, WASH. TIMES, July 17, 2003, at A19:
Mr. Comey indicted Martha because she publicly declared her innocence....
Mr. Comey's invented charge ignores the fact that in our legal system a person
is innocent until proven guilty .... Mr. Comey follows up this preposterous
charge with another. He indicts Martha for covering up a crime of which she is
not accused .... [T]he investigation ... found no basis for a felony charge of
insider trading .... Regardless of your opinion of Martha, do you want to live
under a "Catch-22" legal system like the one Mr. Comey has devised in which
a person must incriminate oneself or be indicted for fraud?
56 See Randall Smith & Kara Scannell, Inside Quattrone Jury Room, Discord Culminates in
Mistrial, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at Al. The final vote was 8-3 for conviction on two counts and
6-4 for acquittal on a third count. Important to those jurors that voted for conviction was Mr.
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Easier can be far from easy. White-collar defense attorneys say
the failure of the government to win a conviction against
[Quattrone] will give prosecutors pause in a strategy they have
employed widely in the string of high-profile scandals that
rocked the business world over the past two years: Go for the
lesser, seemingly simpler charge, if the big one looks too tricky
to try before a jury.57
III. THE PROSECUTOR'S CIVIL/CRIMINAL CHOICE
The development of sideshow prosecutions also suggests more serious
questions. Should we understand that business scandals ought to be more
appropriately tried in civil prosecutions, where the burden of proof is lower? 58 The
fines can still be substantial and other penalties, such as disabling violators from
ever again working in their chosen occupations, can be severe. Civil prosecutions
could also be tried before expert judges, knowledgeable in accounting and finance.
Or, in the alternative, is our criminal system in need of substantial overhaul to
handle such cases? With the increasing use of sideshow charges we may also be
getting reform of the criminal system by stealth and misdirection. The sideshow
charges provide a method of reducing the elements of a crime, or, in effect,
relaxing burdens of proof, and simplifying cases for juries that make the criminal
law a more effective weapon in financial fraud cases. One wonders whether a
more direct, honest approach to the problems of criminal trials in financial fraud
cases would be a more wholesome approach.
Perhaps this is just an academic's pipe dream. The difficulties of reforming
our criminal system within presently construed constitutional boundaries (we
cannot, for example, create a selective jury pool to empanel sophisticated juries59),
Quattrone's equivocation on whether he had, as head technology-sector investment banker at
CSFB, directed IPO allocations of hot issues.
57 Kara Scannell & Randall Smith, Quattrone Mistrial May Give Prosecutors Reasons to
Hesitate, WALL ST. J., Oct 27, 2003, at C1.
58 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319
(1996) (government prosecutors should use civil rather than criminal actions against corporate
entities). For a discussion of burdens of proof, see John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding
Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065 (1968); Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An
Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994).
59 There are constitutional dimensions to many aspects of these prosecutions. See, e.g., Mark
D. Hunter, SEC/DOJ Parallel Proceedings: Contemplating the Propriety of Recent Judicial Trends,
68 Mo. L. REv. 149 (2003) (discussing the problems in simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings
against one set of defendants for one set of transactions); Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello,
White-Collar Crime: Limiting Venue for Business Crime Prosecutions, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 6, 2002, at 3;
David Horan, Breaking the Seal on White-Collar Criminal Search Warrant Materials, 28 PEPP. L.
REv. 317 (2001) (noting the debilitating effect on a business of a government search warrant that
permits or requires possession of all a business's operating records); Amber Harding et al.,
Procedural Issues, 39 AM. CRIM L. REv. 923 (2002) (focusing on white collar crime litigation); see
also Thomas Keifer Wedeles, Fishing for Clarity in a Post-Hubbell World: The Need for a Bright-
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suggest that we ought to take a fresh look60 at relying more heavily on civil
prosecutions in complex financial scandal prosecutions, both alone or in
conjunction with parallel proceedings in criminal court.61 There are several new
provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation that give the SEC new powers in civil
cases. The SEC can not only fine offenders but also can ban them from
participating in the financial services industry or from serving on the board of
directors of a publicly traded corporation.
There is some evidence that prosecutors are relying more heavily on their
civil powers. The SEC is, for example, relying primarily on civil prosecutions in
the mutual fund scandals of this year (2003).62 Eliot Spitzer, the New York
Line Rule in the Self-Incrimination Clause's Act of Production Doctrine, 56 VAND. L. REv. 613
(2003) (discussing the power of the government to compel the production of corporate records by an
employee who is asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege).
60 As noted below, civil prosecutions have been used for financial scandals for some time and
their use seems to be on the increase. By a fresh look, I mean a new look at the theoretical
justifications of civil prosecution and, something that is currently missing in the literature, a theory of
when civil rather than criminal prosecution of financial scandals is socially preferable. If I were
asked to develop a theory, I would focus on cases in which indicting financial institutions would
destroy them and, yet, in which holding individuals accountable for the acts of an entire institution
would be unfair (and hard to slip by juries). This was the basis for the Manhattan District Attorney's
Office's decision not to prosecute Enron's biggest bankers: J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup
Inc. and its officials. The office settled its investigation for an agreement from the banks to pay a
civil fine of $300 million and to overhaul their internal compliance procedures. Ann Davis, Enron
Heat Descends on Smaller Players; Other Enjoy Shade, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2002, at C 1:
"We determined that our judges and our juries, if asked to evaluate the criminal
intention of any particular defendant on trial by himself, would have a very
difficult time. The way the corporations that is that projects get divvied up,"
says John Moscow, deputy chief of the D.A.'s Investigation Division. Mr.
Moscow adds that, although outright liars or cheaters should and can be
convicted, it is harder to prosecute group activity, particularly when lawyers
help execute the deals. "If you have someone who's working hard, and has the
opinion of counsel that this is nothing illegal, the conduct of that person and his
colleagues, taken together, may constitute what looks like a crime but no
particular individual may have provable criminal intent," he says.
61 Parallel proceedings produce their own unique set of legal problems, however. Concurrent
litigation raises significant discovery, constitutional, and strategic issues for both the defendant and
the government. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 59; Harding et al., supra note 59, at 942-58; Criminal
Probe Stymies SEC's Case Against Health South CEO, 18 CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LIABILITY
LITIG. REP., No. 23, June 2, 2003, at 6 (describing a federal court's decision to lift an asset freeze
imposed on Richard M. Scrushy in the SEC's civil case because he could not examine witnesses in a
parallel criminal investigation). In many such cases, however, the civil prosecutions await the
outcome of the criminal prosecution. See Harding et al., supra note 59, at 944. Discovery from
Former Enron CFO Must Wait for Criminal Case, 18 CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LIABILITY LITIG.
REP., No. 19, Apr. 7, 2003, at 3 (a federal judge stayed discovery in the civil case against Andrew
Fastow until the criminal case was resolved).
62 See, e.g., Reed Abelson & Riva Atlas, Regulators' Complaint Outlines Fraud Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2003, at C1 (founders of PBHG Funds); Deborah Solomon & John Hechinger, SEC
Takes Heat for Quick Deal with Putnam, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2003, at C1 (actions against Putnam
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attorney general, backed off threats to bring criminal charges against a mutual fund
trader when the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the SEC convinced
him that a forced closing of the firm and civil fraud actions against the firm's
executives would be a sufficient remedy.63 Spitzer also relied on a civil
prosecution under the New York Martin Act to sue Merrill Lynch for the
recommendations of its securities analysts64 and to sue Salomon Smith Barney and
several of its high profile clients for "spinning" hot IPOs. 65 The prosecution of
Invesco is in three civil suits brought by a coordinated effort of the SEC and the
state attorneys-general of both New York and Colorado.66 In the Martha Stewart
case the federal government is pursuing parallel proceedings in civil and criminal
courts.6 7
The major criticism of such civil prosecutions is that fines thus imposed can
be less than the profits actually made from the illegal conduct and that, as such, the
fines are merely a "cost" of doing the nefarious business. This involves more than
the historic debate over whether civil law is a more appropriate tool than criminal
law at "pricing" behavior to force individuals to internalize the costs of their
behavior; 68 it is the claim that the civil fines are consistently significantly lower
than the profits obtained from the illegal conduct.69 Jack Grubman settled the
Investment Management and Morgan Stanley); John Hechinger, Carrick Mollenkamp & David
Armstrong, Civil Charges Are Expected in Fund Scandal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2003, at C 1.
63 Riva D. Atlas & Diana B. Henriques, US. Closes Mutual Fund Intermediary, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 26, 2003, at C1 (discussing the prosecution of the Security Trust company, an intermediary in
the processing of mutual fund trades by pension plans).
64 John Cassidy, The Investigation: How Eliot Spitzer Humbled Wall Street, THE NEW YORKER,
Apr. 7, 2003, at 54.
65 See, e.g., Charles Pretzlik & Gary Silverman, Wall Street Under Fire, FIN. TIMES (London
ed.), Oct. 4, 2002, at 19. Spitzer alleged that the investment bank allocated shares in hot (under-
priced) IPOs to clients who were CEOs in operating companies and could cause their own companies
to direct future investment banking business Salomon's way.
66 See, e.g., Riva D. Atlas & David Barboza, Funds Scandal Hits Invesco and Founder of
Strong, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003, at Cl.
67 Because the judge in the civil case has not stayed the case pending the outcome of the
criminal case, the parallel proceedings in the Stewart case are producing their share of ticklish legal
questions. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, Stewart Seeks an Unusual Pretrial Advantage, WALL ST. J., Dec.
1, 2003, at C1 (reporting that Stewart's lawyers are attempting to compel deposition in the civil case
to gain access to government information that is not available to them until two weeks before trial in
the criminal case).
68 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1991) (arguing
that criminal law should prohibit, not price, behavior); see also Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions,
84 COLUM. L. REv. 1523 (1984) (distinguishing sanctions and prices as the basis for legal rules).
69 See, e.g., Daniel Gross, Is this Any Way to Punish Fraud?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 19,
2003, at 16:
In virtually every instance, it is worth it for the firms and individuals to pay the
fines-because it was worth it for the firms to engage in the sort of behavior
that earned the fine in the first place. The $1.4 billion in fines-which will be
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threat of a civil action against him for false stock touting by agreeing to never
again work in the industry and paying a fine of $15 million, less than half of his
severance check.7° The attorney general of Massachusetts has characterized the
SEC's settlement of its civil action against Putnam Investments, for example, as a
"big hug and a kiss."'" The criticism seems harsh in light of the fact that any
successful civil (or criminal, for that matter) prosecution usually unleashes a wave
of private lawsuits ("follow on" suits) led by the country's ablest class action
attorneys.72
Those skeptical of civil prosecutions punctuate their arguments by decrying
the efforts of some defendants in civil suits to seek insurance coverage or tax
deductions for settlements of civil prosecutions. Insurance coverage or tax breaks
may apply to mitigate the effect of civil fines for both corporate and individual
prosecutions.
In years past, public prosecutors could rely on settling civil prosecutions for
substantial amounts of money and take credit for redressing corporate wrongdoing.
As explained below, payments made by individuals were often reimbursed by the
corporation or insurance companies and, if not, were deductible against income for
tax calculations. The recent scandals have given renewed attention to
indemnification, insurance and tax relief values that have been long appreciated
inside corporate boardrooms, but not understood by those on the street comer.
On the corporate level, there is no legal barrier to insurance coverage for civil
fines; the only real limit is imposed by the outlines of the contract coverage that
insurance companies are willing to write.73 Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB), for
considerably less after taxes and potential insurance collections-amounts to
only a tiny fraction of the immense profits companies earned as a result of the
corrupt practices for which they are being sanctioned. Morgan Stanley's share
of the global settlement amounts to $125 million (pre-tax). But that amounts to
about 0.6 percent of its $19 billion in 2002 revenues. The ten firms in question
probably clocked about $1.4 billion on a few good days in 1999.
See also Emily Thornton, Wall Street's Fine Mess: How Much Should Brokerages and Banks Pay in
Penaltiesfor Their Tainted Research?, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Dec. 16, 2002 (fines are mere slaps on the
wrist unless they are much higher than the $100 million that Merrill Lynch must pay), available at
http://www.businessweek.com/bsdaily/dnflash/dec2002/nf20021216_5177.htm.
70 Cassidy, supra note 64, at 54.
71 Solomon & Hechinger, supra note 62, at C15.
72 See, e.g., Jeff Chorney, Wall Street Settlement With Regulators Reveals Practices That May
Bring Wave of Private Suits, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV., May 6, 2003 (noting that courts have selected
Milberg Weiss, the country's most prominent securities class action specialist, to chair a six-firm
committee of plaintiffs' counsel in a series of more than 800 actions involving more than 180 initial
public offerings underwritten by the large Wall Street investment banks. Experts value the exposure
of defendants in the cases at over $6 billion.). But see Setback For Investors' Wall Street Lawsuits,
FIN. NEWS, July 6, 2003 (noting that Judge Pollack ruled that investors could not, without better
evidence, blame fraudulent analysts' reports from the major investment banks for their market
losses).
73 There are common law contract doctrines on agreements that violate "public policy."
Included in this category are insurance agreements that cover intentional or willful wrongdoing. See
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example, sued its insurer, a unit of Chubb, for $45 million of a $100 million
settlement with New York's Attorney General over how the firm allocated initial
public offerings to favored clients.74 CSFB's policy coverage excluded "taxes or
fines or penalties imposed by law" and CSFB argues that the settlement amounts
not specifically identified as a "penalty" are covered by the policy.
75
Individual executive defendants, barred from seeking indemnification for
criminal fines, 76 may seek coverage of civil fines under company indemnification
promises and company provided personal insurance (so called "D & 0 insurance").
Corporate law permits corporations to indemnify directors and officers for
expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines and settlement amounts paid
in civil prosecutions on a finding that the defendant "acted in good faith and in a
manner reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation. '77  It is common for corporations to promise executives
indemnification to the full extent "allowed by law" and then buy D & 0 insurance
to reimburse the corporation for any such payments. Corporations then
supplement the indemnification promise (and its D & 0 policy surety) with a
separate provision in the D & 0 policies, payable directly to individual officers,
that provides coverage exceeding what the law allows for indemnification. 8 The
coverage of this supplementing insurance is limited only by what insurance
companies are willing to write and corporations are willing to pay.79
Terrence G. Stolly, Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Unexpected
Implications on Director and Officer Liability and D & 0 Insurance, 29 CAP. U. L. REv. 545, 586
(2001).
74 See, e.g., Elliot Blair Smith, Some Banks Might Seek Insurance Help, USA TODAY, May 8,
2003, at 3B.
75 Id.
76 Corporate indemnification for criminal fines is not allowed under state corporate statutes
unless "he had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful." MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 8.51(a)(1)(iii). There is also a general public policy against agreements granting indemnification
for criminal activity. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969) (invalidating
an underwriter's claim for indemnification from the issuing corporation for 1933 and 1934 Act
liabilities).
77 See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 145(a) (2001). The corporation may also indemnify a
senior executive in a criminal action only if she "had no reasonable cause to believe [that her]
conduct was unlawful." Id. If a director successfully defends criminal charges, she may demand
indemnification, even if the victory is but a technical escape. See Perconti v. Thorton Oil Co., C.A.
No. 18630-NC (Del. Ch., May 3, 2002) (mistrial on charges related to misuse of corporate funds).
78 See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 145(g) (2001) (permitting insurance coverage "whether or
not the corporation would have the power to indemnify such person against such liability of this
section").
79 In theory, insurance companies could agree to cover civil fines paid by individual officers
when they did not act in "good faith," for example. D & 0 policies typically include a dishonest,
criminal or fraudulent conduct exclusion. See Stolly, supra note 73, at 584. Some states also have
statutory limits. A New York statute, for example, excludes insurance coverage of liability payments
to a director who is adjudicated liable for deliberately dishonest actions or for an illegally obtained
personal gain. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 726(b)(1) (McKinney 2003).
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The SEC takes the position that corporate indemnification agreements
covering liabilities of directors and officers arising under the Securities Act of
1933 are void as against public policy.80 Commentators read the policy statement
to include the 1934 Act as well.8' Some states have chafed over the policy.82 In
any event, the SEC policy does not extend to reducing director or officer exposure
to federal securities liability through D & 0 insurance, 83 nor does the SEC object
to corporations advancing or reimbursing directors and officers for defense
expenses.84
Recent scandals show the application of the indemnification and insurance
agreements. In Adelphia Communications, for example, the former CEO and his
three officers/relatives demanded that either the company or its D & 0 insurance
carriers pay the defense costs of personal criminal and civil prosecutions. 85  The
demand started litigation between the company and the insurance carriers over
who would pay. 86  In a $22 million settlement with six top Xerox Corporation
executives of allegations of accounting fraud, the company (the shareholders that
had been defrauded) paid $19 million of the fines and the executive's legal fees to
boot.
87
80 Item 510, Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. 229.510 (2003); see also Item 512, Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.512(h)(3) (2003). Item 510 requires the disclosure of the SEC position against indemnification
in a prospectus when a firn discloses its indemnification agreements with directors. In Item 512, the
SEC conditions acceleration of the effective date of the registration statement under the 1933 Act on
a disclosure, known as the "Johnson and Johnson formula," that the registrant had been advised of the
SEC's position against indemnification, that on a claim for indemnification the corporation will
submit the issue to a court "unless in the opinion of its counsel the matter [of indemnification] has
been settled by controlling precedent."
8! See JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS:
INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE § 9.13, at 29 (1982); see also Heizer Corp v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330
(7th Cir. 1979), modified, King v. Gibbs, 876 F.2d 1275 (7th Cir. 1989) (dismissing cross-claims for
indemnification against Rule lOb-5 liabilities).
82 Wisconsin, dismissing the SEC policy, has adopted an indemnification provision in its
Business Corporation laws that provides that it is the public policy of Wisconsin to permit
indemnification against liabilities imposed under federal securities laws. WIS. STAT. § 180.0859
(2002) (adopted in 1987).
83 See, e.g., SEC Rule 461, 17 C.F.R. 230.461(c) (2003) (insurance against federal securities
liabilities is not considered a bar to acceleration of the effective date of a registration statement).
84 Some claim that the SEC will not block indemnification for settlements of, as opposed to
judgments in, federal securities actions. See Stolly, supra note 73, at 587.
85 See In re Adelphia Comm. Corp., Civ. Action Number 03-703 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2003),
appealfiled.
86 The Bankruptcy Court held that the insurance companies should pay $300,000 per defendant
in the first phase of the defense and left the door open for future requests. Id.; see also United States
v. Weissman, No. S2 94 Cr. 760, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8540 (S.D.N.Y., June 13, 1997) (company
bound to pay legal fees through the appeal or any applications for post-conviction relief).
87 SEC Wants Execs to Pay Fines Out of Their Own Pockets; Many of Those Facing Penalties
Are Covered by Insurance Policies Bought by the Company, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2003, at Pt. 3, p.5.
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Tax law comes into play as well. Tax deductions are available for the
expenses of defending against both criminal and civil actions. 88  At issue is
whether a tax deduction is available for payments made to the government as a
consequence of the litigation. Corporations may deduct disgorgement payments
made in response to civil prosecutions if the payments are not "fines or
penalties. 89 When the New York Attorney General and the SEC were negotiating
a settlement with Wall Street brokerage houses over illegal stock touting, a rumor
that the firms would deduct two-thirds of the settlement payments caught the
attention of Senator Charles E. Grassley, Chairman of the Finance Committee.9"
Senator Grassley asked the SEC to include language in the settlement to prevent
the firms from deducting the settlement payments. He also asked the SEC to
report to Congress on settlement language and introduced legislation limiting the
tax deduction to payments made in restitution to people for harm actually
suffered. 9'
Rather than attempt to force an admission by defendants that the settlement
was a "penalty," to force defendants to otherwise admit guilt, 92 or to put other
language of characterization in the settlement agreement, the SEC took a
simplifying tack. The SEC sought and received binding assurances from settling
defendants that they would not seek reimbursement for some or all of the
88 Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966) (income tax deduction allowed for expenses
incurred in the unsuccessful defense of criminal charges under the Securities Act of 1933).
89 I.R.C. § 162(f) (2003); I.R.S. Reg. §1.162-21 (2003). If the payment is "remedial" rather
than a "penalty," it is deductible. See Middle Atlantic Distributors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.
1136 (1979). A taxpayer's repayment to a third party of funds improperly or unlawfully obtained
usually will not be a penalty. Senator Grassley believed that the "media coverage today might
significantly overstate the after-tax cost and actual burden on Wall Street" if two-thirds of the
settlement payments made proved to be deductible. Press Release, Senator Charles Grassley,
Statement to Reporters and Editors on Global Settlement (April 28, 2003), available at
http://grassley.senate.gov/releases/2003/p03r04-28.htm.
90 Luisa Beltran, Senators Question $1.4 Billion Wall Street Settlement, CBS MARKETWATCH
(April 24, 2003). In the proposed $1.4 billion settlement with the investment bankers, $487 million
in civil penalties was not tax deductible but Senator Grassley was concerned that the $387 million in
disgorgement of profits, the $432 in million assessments for an independent research organization,
and the $80 million fund for investor education would be deductible.
91 See Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (April 28, 2003). The proposed
Government Settlement Transparency Act of 2003 denies a tax deduction of any payments made in
settlement of civil prosecutions, including those where there is no admission of guilt or liability.
Payments made for restitution to harmed people would remain tax-deductible. A related case
involved the agreement of Philip Anschutz to pay over $4.4 million to charity in settlement of the
New York Attorney General's mivestigation into Anschutz's privileged treatment in IPO allocations.
When the press reported that Anschutz could take a charitable deduction for the donations, Anschutz
quickly replied that he had already exceeded charitable deduction limit with other donations. See The
Anschutz Ransom, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2003, at A16.
92 One SEC Commissioner, Harvey Goldschmid, raised the possibility of having defendants
admit guilt in the settlements. Most SEC settlements do not require a defendant to admit or deny
charges. See Craig Schneider, SEC May Dump Indemnity Policy (June 17, 2003), at http://www.
cfo.com/Article?article=9802.
[Vol 1:443
2004] EARLY OBSERVATIONS OF BUSINESS SCANDALS 465
settlement amounts. In the final $1.4 billion settlement over illegal stock touting in
IPOs, investment banks involved agreed not to deduct the payments made from
their income taxes or use insurance to pay those amounts.93 In the Xerox
settlement, noted above, the SEC required the six individuals to agree to pay $3
million of their own fines rather than be indemnified by Xerox.94 These harsher
settlement bargains and the power of the SEC to seek non-monetary penalties in
civil prosecutions, barring an individual from serving as a director or officer in a
publicly traded company, for example, have made civil prosecutions a more
powerful alternative to criminal prosecutions.
The SEC's tougher stance in civil settlements will reopen the debate over
whether there should be limits on insurance against civil fines for companies and
tighter limits on indemnification and insurance for civil fines levied on senior
executives in publicly traded companies. 95
In the end, however, our reluctance to rely on civil settlements may stem from
a public understanding that jail time for offending executives is the proper
penalty.96 Many are hopeful that jail time will provide a "wake up call" to those in
the business community that have lost their ethical moorings.97
93 See, e.g., SEC Names Firms for Restitution Fund, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 2003, at part 3, p. 3;
see also Robert Schmidt, SEC Wants Settlements in Which Defendants Pay Own Fines, CHIC. SUN-
TIMES, June 17, 2003, at 49.
94 See Schmidt, supra note 93.
95 The new SEC policy "troubled" former SEC enforcement director and federal judge Stanley
Sporkin. The change will make it harder for the SEC to settle cases, Sporkin noted, and make
insurance less attractive and less valuable to companies. Id. The policy considerations of the
company and individual situations are distinguishable. Insurance for company payments gives
insurance companies an incentive to monitor and evaluate company bona fides when deciding
whether to insure and for how much. The insurance companies can thus provide an effective private
compliance supplement to public prosecutors. When companies indemnify their own officers,
however, agency problems complicate the analysis; the officers control the companies that indemnify
them. The agency problem supports more stringent controls on the process of indemnification or on
the boundaries of the indemnification payments themselves.
96 The public appetite for criminal prosecutions in corporate fraud cases is often distasteful to
academics. Consider the comments of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., discussing "white collar"
scandals of the past several decades:
In general, the public has shown little apprehension about the use of the
criminal sanction in these cases, but rather has applauded its use. No one...
can doubt the attitude of the American public: it has wanted prison sentences
imposed-substantial ones. In part, this may simply reflect the public's
enjoyment of the spectacle of the once mighty made humble, but the possibility
at least exists that those commentators who predicted an erosion in respect for
the criminal law if it was used to enforce economic regulations have either
overestimated the legal sophistication of the American public or
underestimated its appetite for bread and circuses. Possibly, the public is more
concerned about being victimized by the underlying offenses, or possibly it
simply does not believe that it will be at risk from such prosecutions.
Coffee, supra note 68, at 236. Professor Coffee has been a longtime critic of the extensive use of the
criminal law in corporate scandal cases. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring
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Experts in business ethics disagree among themselves on whether the public
sentiment is correct. Some call criminal prosecutions a "distraction" and call for a
deeper and more enduring cultural resolve against fraudulent conduct; 98 others say
jail sentences are a "huge factor" in persuading people to behave ethically in
business.99 All ethics experts, however, are humbled at the lack of success of their
corporate ethics compliance programs. Many of the offending CEOs were from
companies that had internal ethics programs designed by well-paid ethics
experts.100
Perhaps the most valuable benefit of the increased threat of criminal
prosecution may not be picked up by raw statistics. Lawyers, particularly in-house
counsel, have related, off-the-record, that legal compliance advice at the board
level, now punctuated by the threat of personal criminal exposure, receives
immediate and serious consideration.' 0' In short, increased exposure to criminal
penalties has led senior executives to put more stock in the firm lawyer's advice.
Business people may chafe over the enhanced role of attorneys in the operation of
corporate affairs, but the fact remains that lawyers hold a newly defined position of
of the Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875
(1992); John C. Coffee, Jr., Hush!: The Criminal State of Confidential Information after McNally and
Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of Overcriminalization, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 121 (1988);
John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary
Duties and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 117 (1981). He
argues that "there is a social loss in defining the criminal law so that individuals cannot safely avoid
its application." Coffee, supra note 68, at 220. His work builds on two earlier themes in the
academic literature. First is the claim that vague or general penal statutes will have a "chilling effect"
on legitimate behavior. See Isaac Ehelich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 263 (1974); see also William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and
the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONT. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1996). And second is the claim that as more
behavior becomes subject to criminal sanctions, less stigma will be attached to criminal convictions.
See HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 273 (1968); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958); Sanford Kadish, Some
Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions to Enforce Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV.
423 (1963).
97 See Seglin, supra note 17.
98 See Philip A. Feigin, Do We Really Have To Do This?, LAW WEEK COLORADO, June 2003, at
6 ("In my 20 years of fraud investigation I grew to believe that a long prison sentence is of very little
deterrent effect to the true criminals, because each one who sets out to defraud believes he or she is
smarter than the oafs who got caught before them."); see also Ken Brown & Ianthe Jeanne Dugan,
Sad Account: Andersen's Fall From Grace Is a Tale of Greed and Miscues, WALL ST. J., June 7,
2002, at Al; Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2002).
99 See Ribstein, supra note 98 (comparing the skeptical views of Daryl Koehn, director of the
Center for Business Ethics at the University of St. Thomas in Houston, and Ronald F. Thiemann,
professor of religion and society at Harvard Divinity School, with the more positive view of Scott
Harshberger, an ex-state attorney general and now corporate lawyer).
1oo Id.
101 Conversations with participants in a conference of in-house counsel at the Moritz College of
Law in May 2003.
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power in all publicly traded firms. When a lawyer tells a board that a proposed
course of conduct is, or even may be, illegal, it is an effective, single-vote veto of
the decision.
More than ever before, a counseling lawyer had better know her stuff and
have some common sense to boot. Among other things, for example, the old days
of knee jerk conservative counseling (to be on the safe side) are over. Excessive
conservatism in a lawyer's advice will damage the competitive position of a firm.
On the other hand, a lawyer who lets things slide and is not right up-to-date on the
latest legal rules and requirements can expose the firm to the threat of ruinous
criminal prosecutions. Firms will distinguish themselves in the competitive
marketplace as never before on the quality of their legal advice.
IV. FEDERAL/STATE COMPETITION IN PROSECUTIONS
The uneasy and very public competition between federal prosecutors and
those of several states is a notable aspect of the 2002 scandals. The very public
tension between the New York attorney general Eliot Spitzer and the two chairs of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, Harvey Pitt and his successor William
Donaldson, was reported, minute-by-minute, in the financial press.10 2 There were
a succession of public criticisms, 10 3 intermingled with statements of cooperation
and mutual respect.' 4  The low point came when Wall Street institutions
succeeded, for a time, in convincing prominent members of the House to propose,
and Donaldson to support, legislation to pre-empt some state prosecutions and
rule-making. 0 5 When the mutual fund scandals erupted in 2003, legislators, in
102 One of the better pieces done on the clash was John Cassidy, The Investigation: How Eliot
Spitzer Humbled Wall Street, THE NEW YORKER, April 7, 2003, at 54.
103 See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, It's Spitzer vs. the SEC on Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19,
2003, at C 1; Adrian Michaels, Feud Between Spitzer and SEC Heats Up: Barely Suppressed Tension
Now Spilling Over, FIN. TIMES (London ed.), July 16, 2003, at 24; Landon Thomas, Jr., State, Intent
on Regulating, Look at Morgan, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2003, at Cl.
104 See, e.g., Eliot Spitzer, Pitt Call a Truce on Wall St.: Financial Enforcers Vow to Cooperate,
WASH. POST., Oct. 4, 2002, at El; Riva D. Atlas, SEC Chief Plays Down Clash with State Attorneys-
General, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at C2.
105 The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003, H.R. 2179, 108th
Cong., (1st Sess. 2003) (Sponsors Richard H. Baker, R-La, Sue W. Kelly, R-NY, Doug Ose, R-Ca,
Michael G. Oxley, R-Oh, and Patrick J Tiberi, R-Oh). The legislation also would prevent states from
imposing, among other things, conflict of interest rules on brokerage firms. If the bill had been law
in 2002, it would have prevented Eliot Spitzer, the New York Attorney General, from pursuing his
investigation into stock analyst conflicts at the major Wall Street brokerage houses that led to ten
firms agreeing to pay $1.4 billion in fines and to institute internal, structural changes to their
operations. Spitzer publicly denounced the bill. See Thomas, supra note 103. The editorial page of
the Wall Street Journal supported the bill. See Curbing Mr. Spitzer, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2002, at
A14 ("Mr. Spitzer should calm down."). The bill was similar to a draft amendment to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act circulated in June of 2002 and pushed by Morgan Stanley. See Gretchen Morgenson, Bill
to Limit Oversight of Wall St. Gains, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2003, at C2. Conspiracy theorists could
even claim that Harvey Pitt's final downfall was not his public political failures but his failure to
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hearings on the issue, listened to Spitzer charge that the SEC was "asleep at the
switch"'10 6 and had to agree; the legislation was quietly dropped.
10 7
Spitzer's success has led other state attorneys general to be more active as
well. 10 8 Critics of the aggressive enforcement activities of the state attorneys
general decry the "balkanization"' 0 9 or decentralization of the country's securities
regulation. The federal government and the states, it is argued, are tripping over
each other's investigations" 0 and vying with each other to set industry standards
and rules in the settlement of their cases."' Companies under investigation argue
"slap down" Spitzer, which angered the powerful institutions on Wall Street. See, e.g., Sara Hansard,
Counting on Pitt's Successor to Keep Spitzer, et al., at bay; Street to Donaldson: Curb State
Watchdogs, INVESTMENT NEws, Dec. 16, 2002 ("Wall Street executives were left seething after Mr.
Pitt failed to pre-empt or rein in Mr. Spitzer early on in the controversy over stock analysts.").
106 Tom Lauricella, Spitzer Seeks Forfeiture of Some Fund Advisory Fees, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3,
2003, at C 1I (Spitzer made the charge in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Financial
Management); see also Solomon & Hechinger, supra note 62, at C15 (describing the SEC failure to
act on tips and its failure to find problems in a four month investigation as "embarrassed" by Eliot
Spitzer who "stepped ahead" of the agency and uncovered "massive fraud" in the mutual fund
industry).
107 Deborah Solomon, Zealous States Shake Up Legal Status Quo, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2003,
at A4. The bill did make it through the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and
Government Sponsored Enterprises and was reported to the full House Committee on Financial
Services. See Morgenson, supra note 105, at C2.
108 See Solomon, supra note 107, at A4. Spitzer's success with the decades old New York
Martin Act has led over 20 states to pass or consider their own versions of the federal Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation. Id.
109 Richard Baker, the Republican Chairman of the House subcommittee on capital markets, has
used the term repeatedly. See Joshua Chaffm, Probe Targets Morgan Stanley: US State Securities
Regulators Claims Investment Bank Misled Customers Over Mutual Funds, FIN. TIMES (London ed.),
July 15, 2003, at 15. So did Michael Oxley, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee.
See Joshua Chaffin, Determination of a Crusader Brings the Banks to Heel: State Attorney General's
Rise to Prominence, FIN. TIMES (London ed.), Dec. 21, 2002, at 17; see also Straight Talk From Eliot
Spitzer, Bus. WK., Oct. 6, 2003, at 130 (responding to the charge of balkanization):
We do not want balkanization. That would be bad for capital formation, bad
for investors, bad for the economy. Having said that, enforcement has always
been distributed among various layers of government. We have federal, state,
and local enforcement. That has been the case since the early part of the last
century.... We have had this duality of enforcement for the past 80 or so
years without confusion or dislocation.
110 The case that has angered federal officials the most seems to be the Okalahoma Attorney
General's criminal prosecution against executives of Worldcom, now MCI. See Barnaby J. Feder &
Kurt Eichenwald, A State Pursues WorldCom, and May Hurt the US. Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
2003 at CI; Solomon, supra note 107, at A4; see also Riva S. Atlas, SEC Chief Plays Down Clash
with State Attorneys-General, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 15, 2003, at C2; Yochi Dreazen, States Mull Civil
Lawsuits Charging MCI with Tax Fraud, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2003, at BI (criticizing the
Oklahoma action, as "re-fighting an old battle," and distinguishing it from Spitzer's mutual fund
investigation, which "opened a new front" on a whistle-blower's tip).
Ill See, e.g., Amy Borrus & Mike McNamee, States vs. The Feds: A Fragile Truce, BUS. WK.,
Sept. 2, 2003, at 106.
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that their exposure to prosecutions by fifty-six state attorneys general (there are
fifty states and six territories) with inconsistent restructuring demands is chaotic
and hugely expensive.
The claim appears disingenuous in light of the evidence." 2 The power of the
state officials, so feared by companies, is generated by their newfound willingness
to work together and coordinate their efforts, not their provincialism." 3 The state
attorneys general met and divided up responsibility for investigating the
investment banks' securities analysts' false stock touting and agreed to share
information and resources. Spitzer investigated Salmon, Smith Barney (a division
of Citigroup), and Merrill Lynch; Utah took Goldman Sachs; Massachusetts took
Credit Swiss First Boston; Alabama took Lehman Brothers; New Jersey took Bear
Stearns; Texas took J.P Morgan Chase; California took Deutsche Bank; and
Connecticut, Arizona and Florida took UBS Warburg." 4 This hardly sounds like
balkanization. It is the cooperation of the states, not their maverick behavior, that
has companies quaking. It is not surprising that many of these banks participated
in the $1.4 billion "global settlement" announced in April of 2003. "'
Critics also fault the motives of state attorneys general in bringing the
cases. 116 The state officials, they argue, are engaging in political grandstanding,
trying to further their personal political careers at the expense of careful, planned
prosecutions."i7 State attorneys general often run for governor. Moreover, critics
112 See, e.g., Allan Sloan, Reform? Don't Celebrate Yet, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 4, 2003, at 45 (real
reason for beginning legislation is pressure from Wall Street to rein in Spitzer).
113 See, e.g., Enemy of the States. Companies are Increasingly Worried by the Growing Power,
and Desire, of American 's State Attorneys-General to Regulate and Punish Them, ECONOMIST, Sept.
6, 2003, at 53 [hereinafter Enemy of the States].
114 See Capitulate or Die, ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 2002, at 86.
115 See Patrice Hill, Investment Fraud Costs Brokerages; 10 Firms to Pay $1.4 billion in fines;
Hold Billions for Suits, WASH. TIMES, April 19, 2003, at Al (The $1.4 billion includes $875 million
in fines, $80 million for investor education and $450 million in seed money for an independent
research fund. About $390 million of the fines was to be returned to investors. The investment
banks also agreed to new rules of conduct and to restructure internal compliance systems.).
116 For a summary of the positions discussed in this paragraph see Enemy of the States, supra
note 113, at 53-54. Spitzer is the target: "From his $1.4 billion "global settlement" with Wall
Street's ten-biggest securities firms in April, Mr. Spitzer wrung nearly $500 million for state coffers,
and invaluable publicity for his blossoming political career-without even detailing quite how the
banks were supposed to have broken the law." Id.
117 For a particularly harsh assessment, see Editorial, Curbing Mr. Spitzer, WALL ST. J., July 24,
2003, at A14:
Mr. Spitzer had an elaborate theory about how the Street's behavior during the
Internet boom amounted to criminal fraud, but he was careful never to test it
with actual indictments-perhaps because he didn't want to bum his bridges to
New York's biggest industry and most generous campaign contributors. The
threat was there, however. CEOs felt more or less blackmailed into agreeing to
quasi-regulatory changes that Mr. Spitzer had no business dictating on behalf of
the rest of the country.
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argue that the state officials have discovered that these cases are a rich new source
of revenue in a time when states are strapped for cash. The argument seems to
defeat itself at some level as failed prosecutions or prosecutions in which
defendants are given "slap-on-the-wrist" penalties are hardly the stuff for political
capital. In any event, the evidence that state attorneys general act exclusively with
such motives is thin; most believe what they declare when they take their oath of
office. Moreover, one hopes that there is room for advancing one's political career
by doing what is right and in the public interest.
While the ideal system would be a single, well-funded, and active federal
agency enforcing rules against securities fraud, reality offers different lessons. The
SEC was asleep during many of the scandals and too cautious on others. Eliot
Spitzer broke the securities analysts' scandal in 2002,' 18 the IPO spinning scandals
of 2002,'19 and the mutual fund scandal in 2003;2o the SEC did not act, even
though it had, internally, solid indications of the problems. The state attorneys
general have embarrassed the agency, and we are all benefiting as the SEC has
been jolted into action. 2 ' The competition from the states has proven, in fact, to
be very healthy. Recent financial scandals have demonstrated that it is too easy for
a single federal agency, which is itself a large bureaucracy with problems that all
bureaucracies have, to get complacent in its industry oversight and then defensive
when scandal breaks. 22 (The SEC has an enforcement staff of over 830 lawyers;
Mr. Spitzer has 15 lawyers in his investor protection unit. 123) That is, the state
attorneys general are a needed and healthy check on inevitable bureaucratic
indifference by a large federal agency.
There is a legitimate concern over Spitzer's threats to force, on his own,
structural fixes in those industries that are the focus of his investigations. The $1.4
billion settlement of the securities analysts' scandal that included structural relief
was done in negotiations with the brokerage houses that included significant
participation by the SEC. 124 Spitzer's threats to act on his own stimulated a
Is there any self-critical capacity at the Wall Street Journal? How could Spitzer protect campaign
contributions by "blackmailing" potential contributors for $1.4 billion? What a lapse in critical
thinking.
118 See Spitzer, supra note 104, at El.
119 Id.
120 See Thomas, supra note 103; Tom Lauricella, Spitzer Seeks Forfeiture of Some Fund
Advisory Fees, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2003, at C11.
121 For a robust argument along these lines, see Jesse Eisinger, The Okies Take Over, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 29, 2003, at Cl ("it is [the SEC's] culture that sets them up for second rate results").
122 Consider the remarks of Mr. Spitzer to a reporter on testimony of the SEC chairman, William
Donaldson, to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee: "We have to destroy this
canard that the SEC screwed up because they don't have resources. . . . It's a massive army
compared to our guerilla fighters-and look what we can do!" Monica Langley, As His Ambitions
Expand, Spitzer Draws More Controversy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2002, at Al, A8.
123 Id.
124 See Hill, supra note 115.
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coordinated effort that included the SEC. One worries about the limits of his
market expertise should he decide to act alone; that is, to act on his own threats.
As of this writing, for example, Spitzer has struck out on his own in the mutual
fund trading practices scandal to correct excessive mutual fund fees. His
settlement talks with Alliance Capital include a demand that the fund reduce its
fees.125 The demand has irked the chairman of the SEC who argued that any
change in mutual fund fees should be handled though its rule-making process and
that, in any event, "piggybacking" the fee issue on charges of improper trading is
"improper. 1 26 Once again, however, if the negotiations over fees prod the SEC
into action, the investing public may be substantially the better for them.
The scandals of 2002 have taught us that if states are careful not to
compromise federal prosecutions with over-inclusive settlements that bind federal
prosecutors or grants of immunity from prosecution to the same effect,127 state
attorneys general can offer positive and constructive stimulants to a sluggish
federal enforcement effort. Without the prodding of Elliot Spitzer, one wonders
how aggressively the SEC would have responded to the 2002 scandals. I am a bit
awed by how Spitzer did it: He took on not only the powerful investment banks
and brokerage houses of his home jurisdiction in New York (and some of the
world's best paid lawyers), he had to fight the SEC and powerful members of
Congress, carrying the investment bank's water, and the Wall Street Journal (the
country's largest newspaper, based in his home jurisdiction) to do it. Amazing.
V. LAWYERS ON THE STAND AND OTHER FORMS OF "COOPERATION"
The prosecutions of 2002 remind us in dramatic ways of the power of
criminal prosecutions against defendants in the financial industry. In business,
particularly in the financial services industry, the accounting industry, or in the
practice of business law, the players' stock-in-trade is, in large part, their
reputation for integrity. Some operating businesses that need constant access to
the capital markets to survive also live or die on their reputation for financial
integrity. In these businesses or professions, an indictment can ruin a firm, or a
125 See Christopher Oster & Karen Damato, SEC, Spitzer Spar Over Terms of Alliance Capital
Settlement: Bone of Contention is Lower Fees, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2003, at C1.
126 Tom Lauricella, Monica Langley & Susan Pulliam, Spitzer Gambit May Alter Fund-Fee
Debate, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2003 at Cl. When Spitzer agreed to a settlement with Alliance that
included a 20% rollback of fees, the chairman of the SEC publicly denounced the fee settlement.
See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 103.
127 A state or federal prosecutor's decision to grant use immunity for testimony binds both
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448-59 (1972). Moreover, an
accepted guilty plea in one jurisdiction is often respected as a terminating event in another. In the
state of New York, by statute, a federal guilty plea precludes a follow-on New York prosecution.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 40.20, 40.30 (2003).
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career, well before trial. 128 Trial is unnecessary; the damage is done with the
indictment. 129 Vindication, if gained at trial, comes far too late for many in this
community.
There are many applications of this basic principle of the prosecutor's raw
power over defendants whose stock-in-trade is their business reputation, and we
have seen all of them in the prosecutions surrounding the 2002 scandal.
Prosecutors have maximum leverage when threatening charges against
financial companies themselves. It has long been true that business organizations
may be held criminally liable for the wrongdoing of employees or agents. 30 As far
back as 1909, the Supreme Court of the United States noted that, "we see no valid
objection in law, and every reason in public policy" to extend criminal liability to
corporations. 31  Jail time, of course, is not the object of such prosecutions'
criminal fines are all that is possible. But the levy of a criminal fine on a financial
institution, which competes and survives on its customer's confidence in its
integrity, also threatens the future life of the institution itself. A criminal fine in
such a case may be equivalent to a death sentence; 132 at the very least, a criminal
fine will have a substantial negative impact on a financial firm's business. 133
This phenomenon, among others, has led a number of academics over the
years to make the claim that criminal prosecutions of business entities generate
"unproductive, overdeterrance"' 134 that chills legitimate business activity.
128 See John Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn. No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 425-29 (1980) (discussing adverse
publicity problems of a prosecuted company).
129 See, e.g., United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988) (government threatened pre-
trial restraint and forfeiture under RICO of some of the assets of a small investment partnership and
then watched in amazement as the firm promptly died; worried investors immediately withdrew their
funds and forced the partnership to liquidate).
130 For an argument against corporate criminal liability, see Fischel & Sykes, supra note 58, at
319.
131 New York Cent. & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909).
Corporations are criminally liable for any act committed by an employee in the course of such
person's employment that is intended to benefit the corporation. See United States v. Hilton Hotels
Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972). By contrast, under the Model Penal Code, the prosecution
must show that the offense was authorized or performed "by a high managerial agent" acting on
behalf of the corporation. See Model Penal Code § 2.07(l)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see
also Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS
L.J. 593 (1988).
132 See Eric Holder, Don't Indict WorldCom, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 31, 2002, at A8.
133 See generally Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear
from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757 (1993).
134 See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994); Fischel & Sykes, supra note 58, at 332; Vikramaditya S. Khanna,
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996)
(corporate criminal liability is rarely desirable). A new, novel claim is that the prosecution of
business entities leads to underdeterrance of corporate wrongdoing as the prosecutions deflect
attention from individual managers and executives. See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime
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As a consequence of the severity of the effect, a commentator noted as late as
1992 that, "until recently, federal prosecutors rarely made use of this weapon."'
' 35
No longer. Perhaps spurred on by the United States Sentencing Commission's
1991 Federal Sentencing Guidelines, that feature sentences for corporations,1
36
prosecutors now view financial institutions as fair game.
A barely successful criminal prosecution for obstruction of justice sealed the
fate of Arthur Andersen, one of the world's largest accounting firms-the result of
account executives on a single account, the Enron audit, shredding documents in a
Houston office. Thousands of employees lost jobs, hundreds of clients lost
services and the disruption spread worldwide. Drexel Burnham, one of the
country's most active investment banks at the time, did not survive a criminal
indictment in the late '80s. 131
Prosecutors threatening indictments of business firms threaten their business
future, even if the criminal penalties threatened are a small percentage of the firm's
revenue or if the criminal activity was a very minor part of the firm's overall
activities. 38 Firms faced with such threats have very little bargaining power in
Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis (September 2003), at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/
papers/pdffiles/Khanna V032503.pdf.
135 Jed S. Rakoff, The Corporation as Policeman: At What Price, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 9, 1992 at 3, 4.
See also Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on Sentencing Practice in
the Federal Courts, 1988-1990, 71 B.U. L. REv. 247 (1991) (noting the dramatic increase in the rate
of corporate criminal prosecutions).
136 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 8 (1991), 56 Fed. Reg. 22762 (May 16, 1991).
For a detailed discussion of the provisions on business entities, see Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M.
Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical
Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205 (1993); Emmett H.
Miller III, Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants, 46 VAND. L. REv. 197
(1993). Changes are in the wind. On October 8, 2003, the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines delivered its report to the United States Sentencing
Commission. The report contains numerous recommendations. See Press Release, U.S. Sentencing
Commisstion, Panel on the Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations Issues Final Report (Oct. 8,
2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rell00803b.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2004); see also
Julie R. O'Sullivan, Some Thoughts on Proposed Revisions to the Organizational Guidelines, 1 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 487 (2004) (discussing the Advisory Group's report).
137 Drexel vigorously denied any wrongdoing, steadfastly defended its employees and vowed to
fight any charges. Faced with the prospect of a RICO indictment, Drexel pled guilty to six counts of
fraud and paid a $300 million fine. Within months, Drexel had ceased to exist, filing for bankruptcy,
liquidating its assets, and laying off over 3,000 employees. See George Anders, A Shadow of Itself
Drexel Comes Back From Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Apr., 30, 1992, at C1 (detailing the events); see
also FISCHEL, supra note 26.
138 The Sentencing Guidelines released in 1991 make no allowance for significant reputational
loss or loss of the ability to do business after a successful prosecution. Department of Justice
guidelines for prosecuting corporations, however, do permit prosecutors to take into account the
"collateral consequences" of a corporate conviction. See Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer,
White-Collar Crime, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 4,
2003, at 3. Commentary to the DOJ guidelines acknowledges that "severe consequences to a
corporation's officers, directors, employees and shareholders-many of whom may have been
completely uninvolved in and unaware of the criminal conduct and wholly unable to prevent it-may
2004]
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resisting deals. Those who attempt to take bargaining positions that bluff for trial
("we are innocent") risk prosecutorial "leaks" that are extremely damaging. The
leak of a few e-mails may ruin a career or a company; an indictment may not be
necessary.13 9 In this regard, the aggressive, calculating use of the media by the
New York State attorney general may signal a new era in the prosecution of
financial institutions on Wall Street.
140
militate against prosecution." Id. Lest prosecutors get too soft, however, the commentary reminds
readers that "virtually every conviction of a corporation, like virtually every conviction of an
individual, will have an impact on innocent third parties, and the mere existence of such an effect is
not sufficient to preclude prosecution of the corporation." Id. See generally Darryl K. Brown, Third-
Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1383 (2002). The Ad Hoc Advisory Group,
reporting in 2003, also did not address this issue. See generally sources cited supra note 136.
139 Eliot Spitzer, the New York State attorney general, published a pile of Merrill Lynch internal
e-mails when his negotiations with brokerage firms were stalled. In a matter of days Merrill's share
price plunged. Spitzer threatened to release more. The e-mails disparaged companies on which the
firm's stock analysts had given strong buy recommendations. Within two months, Merrill had agreed
to pay $100 million and its chairman had made a public apology. See Joshua Chaffm, The Spitzer
Settlement: Determination of a Crusader Brings the Banks to Heel State Attorney-General's Rise to
Prominence, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2002, at 17. Later some wondered whether Mr. Spitzer had leaked
e-mails embarrassing to Sandy Weill, Citigroup's Chairman and CEO. Id. A stock analyst for a
Salomon Smith Barney (part of Citigroup), Jack Grubman, alleged in an e-mail that Weill had asked
him to upgrade a recommendation on AT&T to win support from the AT&T chairman who sat on the
Citigroup board (to block a rival, John Reed, who is now chairman of the SEC and) to get Weill's
recommendation for his children to get into an exclusive pre-school in New York City. Weill made a
$1 million donation to the pre-school and recommended Grubman's children for admission; the
school complied. See Cassidy, supra note 64, at 54. Mr. Spitzer denies that his office leaked the e-
mail. See After Hours with Maria Bartiromo, (CNBC television broadcast, Dec. 16, 2002) (interview
with Eliot Spitzer); Cassidy, supra note 64, at 54. Weill soon resigned from the boards of both
AT&T and United Technologies. Spitzer did reveal the Grubman e-mails formally in his civil suit
against Salomon Smith Barney a few months later. Jessica Sommar, Solly's Pig' Out-Spitzer
Exposes Grubman's Smoking Gun E-Mail, N.Y. POST, Oct. 1, 2002, at 27.
140 See Cassidy, supra note 64, at 54:
One Wall Street executive says he has never seen anything like the media
manipulation that took place during the analyst probe. "Nothing compares to
this," he said. "Leaking documents, leaking testimony, leaking the intentions
of the regulators. Everything was leaking." Spitzer's courting of reporters also
irked some of his fellow-regulators, particularly those at the SEC and the
NASD, which have a reputation for carrying out investigations discreetly.
Spitzer, on the other hand, saw media management as a legitimate and effective
tool to build momentum for reform. Unlike the national regulators, who have
to deal with Wall Street on an ongoing basis, he saw himself as an independent
outsider, whose role was to uncover abuses and remedy them in any way he
could.
Spitzer's example was followed by the Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth, William
Galvin, who released damaging internal e-mails from Credit Suisse First Boston. Id.; see also
Jonathan D. Glater, Martha Stewart Lawyer Seeks an Inquiry on Possible Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2003, at C4; Patricia Hurtado, Who Leaked Martha News?, NEWSDAY, July 22, 2003, at A14
(Stewart's lawyers accused the government prosecutors of leaking details about her case to the media
before the grand jury had voted on an indictment; they argued that the grand jury may have been
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The power and ease of a prosecutorial threat to indict a financial corporation
is supplemented by a lighter evidentiary burden for obtaining a conviction of a
corporation than of an executive once in trial.' 41 This is a seductive package for
overworked prosecutors living with a public's outrage over well-publicized,
massive financial scandals. 42  Total capitulation to prosecutors by companies
under threat of criminal sanction may be the only real business strategy left to save
a financial firm's future. A more apt description of the companies' only survival
strategy would be the "belly up" approach. 43  Professor Michael Simons has
summed the lessons for financial corporations under investigation:
First, a corporation's best hope to avoid indictment is to engage
in "super cooperation" that will convince prosecutors of its
"good corporate citizenship." Second, that "super cooperation"
may be irrevocably hampered if the firm does not quickly change
its top management. 144
Prosecutors have mounted a spirited defense of the technique. Illustrative is
the argument of Larry D. Thompson, chair of the President's Corporate Fraud Task
Force, in an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal:
Some have also argued that offering a corporation leniency in
return for full and open cooperation with a government
investigation is somehow "coercive." I strongly disagree with
this notion. While it may not redound to the benefit of corrupt
corporate officers, it is always in the corporation's interest to
cooperate fully with the government so that matters under
investigation can be resolved as quickly and fairly as possible.
prejudiced by the leaks; the prosecutors responded by implying that the defense counsel could have
been the source of the leaks).
141 See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Control of Criminal Conduct in Organizations, 71 B.U. L.
REv. 421, 426-27 (1991) (the prosecution may be able to secure the conviction of a corporation
without demonstrating that a particular agent of the corporation is culpable); Elkan Abramowitz &
Barry A. Bohrer, White-Collar Crime Andersen Jury Instruction: A New Collective Corporate
Liability?, N.Y. L.J., July 2, 2002, at 3 (the judge in the Andersen case instructed the jury that it need
not be unanimous as to which Andersen employee acted with criminal intent as long as each juror
believed at least one employee did).
142 Consider the comments of an ex-Southern District of New York prosecutor, W. Neil
Eggleston: "The problem is if you give prosecutors a tool, they will almost never exercise good
judgment in not using it." Vanessa Blum, Two-Edged Tool: Government Seeks Early Waiver of
Attorney-client Privilege, Weighs Cooperation When Charging Corporations, MIAMI DAILY Bus.
REv., Mar. 21, 2003, at A8.
143 When threatened with an attack by an overwhelming superior opponent in a dog fight, one
dog rolls over showing the other its belly in total submission, in an attempt to defuse the attack.
144 Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate
Citizenship," 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 979, 1017 (2002).
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The Justice Department has directed its prosecutors to evaluate
the authenticity and completeness of cooperation from
corporations under investigation. This is important because it
allows the government to conserve its limited resources in
investigations where cooperation is meaningful and reflects
management's commitment to an acceptance of responsibility
for the wrongful conduct at issue. The direction was necessary
because some attorneys who appear before the department
purporting to represent a corporation are in fact representing the
interests of management. 
145
His analysis, which focused solely on results, overlooks the source of the leverage.
A threat to a company in bankruptcy impacts thousands of uncharged,
presumably innocent people for the acts of a few senior executives. The firm
could survive the indictment of its senior executives, who would be terminated in a
reorganization of the firm's management, but it often cannot survive an indictment
of the firm itself. Under such circumstances, avoiding an indictment is the only
way to survive. The firm's life is in the hands and discretion of a prosecutor.
Convincing a prosecutor that a firm is "cooperating" is a firm's only viable
strategy. Since an indicted firm is a dead firm, a decision to defend an indictment
is suicide. With this kind of power, prosecutors can make very heavy demands on
threatened companies.
The Department of Justice has guidelines for prosecuting business
organizations that it reissued in 2003.146 The guidelines include a list of nine
factors that prosecutors should consider in reaching a charging decision against a
company. 147  The factors are: the nature and seriousness of the offense; the
145 Larry D. Thompson, 'Zero Tolerance'for Corporate Fraud, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2003, at
A10. Thompson is also the author of the Thompson Memorandum, discussed in the text at infra pp..
476-77 and note 146.
146 See Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, Department of Justice Sends Clear Message to
Corporate Wrongdoers: An Entity that Pays Lip Service to Cooperation, But that Holds Back in any
Significant Way, Will be Denied Credit for Its Efforts, N.J. L.J., Mar. 24, 2003, at 29 (discussing an
internal policy memorandum of the Justice Department written by Deputy Attorney General Larry D.
Thompson and dated January 20, 2003 entitled, "Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations," now known as the Thompson Memorandum, which updates and revises a 1999
Holder Memorandum entitled, "Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations"); see also
Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 138, at 3.
147 The guidelines focus on the decision to prosecute. One can also look at the judge's decision
to sentence for a similar consideration of "mitigating factors." This article suggests that any financial
firm before a judge for sentencing has already lost. The academic literature on cooperation traces
back to the 1991 sentencing guidelines, however. See, e.g., William S. Laufer, Legal Issues and
Sociolegal Consequences of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Corporate Prosecution,
Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 87 IOWA L. REv. 643 (2002). The sentencing factors do
affect a prosecutor's decision to indict however and also will affect pre-prosecution conduct by firms
seeking to minimize their exposure to criminal litigation. The United States Sentencing Commission
in its 1991 final draft lists as mitigating factors, that an organization has in place an "effective"
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pervasiveness of the wrongdoing within the corporation; the corporation's past
history; cooperation and voluntary disclosure; corporate compliance programs;
offers of restitution and remediation; collateral consequences; the adequacy of
prosecuting responsible individuals; and non-criminal alternatives. The general
categories sound reasonable, but the devil is in the details.
The most controversial feature of the release is the Department's definition of
cooperation.1 48 The Justice Department includes as a gauge of cooperation the
company's willingness not to invoke the attorney-client privilege and attorney
work-product protection. 49  The Department also counts as a negative a
company's "protection" of culpable employees. Companies are penalized for
assisting, in any way, senior executives under investigation. A company, to be
deemed to be cooperating, must work on behalf of the government; it must "find
the culprits and turn them in."'' 50 The Department also notes with disapproval the
advancement of attorneys' fees for their defense. Yet, many companies are bound
compliance program, accepts responsibility for the crime, cooperates with the investigation, or
voluntarily reports the offense. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f)-(g).
148 See Abramowitz & Bohrer, supra note 138, at 31. For an overview of the issues inherent in
cooperation, see Simons, supra note 144, at 979; Laufer, supra note 147, at 643.
149 The waiver is officially voluntary but regarded universally by prosecutors and defense
counsel as mandatory. See John Gibeaut, Junior G-Men: Corporate Lawyers Worry that They're
Doing the Government's Bidding While Doing Internal Investigations, 89 A.B.A. J. 46 (Jun. 2003).
Corporate lawyers claim that the waiver requirement drives a wedge between a company's employees
and its counsel and negatively affects the ability of company counsel to investigate and correct
internal problems. See Richard Ben-Veniste & Lee H. Rubin, DOJ Reaffirms and Expands
Aggressive Corporate Cooperation Guidelines, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 4, 2003, at 11. They
also note that a waiver of attorney-client privilege may apply to follow up private litigation. The
general counsel of Tyco International testified recently that "I am perfectly happy to give over and
waive the attorney-client privilege to the Department of Justice ... except that it is later going to be
used to line the pocket of a rabid plaintiff's bar." Blum, supra note 142, at A8. See generally Lance
Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-
Client Privilege (and Why It is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REv. 469 (2003). There is heated debate over
whether waivers of the privilege for the Department of Justice can be "selective" or otherwise
limited. See, e.g., Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, White-Collar Crime: Waiver Issues in
Corporate Investigations, N.Y. L.J., June 3, 2003, at 3 (finding differences among various
jurisdictions) (Morvillo is Martha Stewart's defense counsel).
The SEC has also adopted a formal agency policy of granting leniency in exchange for
cooperation in civil cases. In the Matter of Gisela de Leon-Meredith, Exch. Act Rel. No. 44969, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,986 (Oct. 23, 2001); Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation
to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Rel. No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001). The SEC
emphasized that the company had "produced the details of its internal investigation, including notes
and transcripts of interviews of [culpable employees]; and it did not invoke the attorney-client
privilege, work product or other privileges or protections with respect to any facts uncovered in the
investigation. Id. at 1.
150 Steve Seidenberg & Tamara Loomis, DOJ Gets Tougher on Corporations: Revised
Guidelines for Bringing a Criminal Case, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24, 2003, at A13 (reporting comments of a
Washington lawyer who specializes in white-collar defense).
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by an employment contract to do so. 151 Must they breach the contract (and lose -in
a trial for an injunction by the injured executive) to satisfy a prosecutor of their
good faith? There are also tales of prosecutors demanding that "cooperating"
companies threaten employees with termination if they do not fully cooperate with
government investigators, to discourage employees from asserting claims of Fifth
Amendment privilege.1
52
Other parts of the guidelines also effectively take away defense choices.
According to one factor, a company must have taken "meaningful" remedial
measures before indictment. Offers of restitution and employee termination are, of
course, public admissions of guilt. Whether they will also affect guilt at trial
depends on the whims of a judge applying a technical rule of evidence.
That prosecutors are in the catbird seat in these arrangements is well
illustrated by how quickly companies have in fact waived attorney-client (or
accountant-client) privileges. The Wall Street Journal headline for the Quattrone
prosecution on the day that jury selection started was "Quattrone Trial: New
Template?"' 53 The story underneath highlighted the government's star witness,
David Brodsky, former Credit Suisse First Boston general counsel.
In the past, it was the rare case that brought lawyers to the
witness stand.... Now, however... [c]ompanies wishing to
avoid onerous charges and fines are ... quick to waive attorney-
client privilege and force lawyers to cooperate with
prosecutors.
54
CSFB waived its privilege protecting Brodsky's internal communications when the
company learned that Brodsky had e-mailed Quattrone notifying him of the
government's investigation of the company's IPO practices. Two days later
Quattrone forwarded an e-mail to his staff on "cleaning up" their files.
A company's waiver of the privilege needs to be distinguished from a close
but separate situation in which a client uses a lawyer as the spokesperson for a
falsehood. If a lawyer relates a lie given by a client, the client can be charged with
151 The policy does recognize that some companies are "bound by law" to do so and that
compliance with such laws should not be considered a failure to cooperate. This is a shallow
distinction. In Ohio, for example, a company, unless it has opted out, must advance expenses; in
Delaware, a company may advance expenses on a request and can bind itself to do so ex ante by
contract. The Justice Department release will cause all states to pass Ohio-type legislation, reducing
company flexibility in negotiating employment agreements. Moreover, the Ohio legislation heads in
the opposite direction from what the Department wants.
152 Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, White-Collar Crime: Issues Raised When Rare
Techniques are Used by Prosecutors, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 10, 2002, at 3. A private organization may use
economic pressure to extract incriminating statements, unconstrained by the Fifth Amendment. The
government cannot.
153 Laurie P. Cohen, Quattrone Trial: New Template?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2003, at C1.
154 Id.
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the fraud, and the lawyer may be subpoenaed to testify against the client at trial. In
the indictment filed against Martha Stewart in June of this year, prosecutors
referred to her use of her lawyers three times. Prosecutors alleged, for example,
that she "caused her attorney to provide" false information to the Wall Street
Journal in an effort to mislead her shareholders. Ms. Stewart's defense lawyers
have been put on notice that, unless she stipulates that her company lawyers based
their statements on her words, the prosecutors will call the company lawyers to the
stand.
The power of prosecutors to forge "partnerships" with corporations has
earned praise for encouraging businesses to join the government in the battle
against corporate corruption.' 55 Prosecutors exchange leniency (a decision not to
indict the firm) for a corporation's cooperation in a joint effort to investigate
internal corporate fraud.156 The cooperation of corporations is said to "free the
hand of regulators and prosecutors and minimize the cost of compliance."' 57 I find
the terminology odd; the terms, "partnership" and "cooperation," imply corporate
consent when the corporation really has no choice in the matter. Coercion is too
strong a description, however; this deal that is no deal is just another instance of
government regulation by mandate.
The danger of the exchange is not in whether it is voluntary or not, however,
but whether, in practice, it will produce more undesirable consequences than
advertised benefits. There is a very real question as to whether the exchange will
significantly increase the unsavory practice of "scapegoating," in which
corporations find and offer up to prosecutors lower echelon officials in order to
save the firm.158 Middle-managers find, to their surprise, their rights eroded' 59 and
their futures clouded by their prominence in the press. 160 To their dismay, both
prosecutors and their own employer have a huge stake in their public humiliation
and incarceration. The prosecutor seeks to relieve public pressure generated by
financial scandals; the firm seeks to survive. Whether those truly guilty inside the
' See, e.g., Otto G. Obermaier, A Practical Partnership, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 11, 1991, at 13
("[T]he 93 United States attorneys are good people to be partners with."). See generally JAY A.
SIGLER & JOSEPH E. MURPHY, INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
REGULATORY COMPULSION (1988) (history of the government-business cooperation model).
156 See Laufer, supra note 147, at 646.
'5' See id. at 646-47.
158 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Criminal Responsibility, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME AND JUSTICE 253, 260 (S.H. Kadish ed., 1983); Laufer, supra note 147, at 663-68; see also
Dean Starkman, Pollution Case Highlights Trend to Let Employees Take the Rap, WALL ST. J., Oct.
9, 1997, at B10 (corporations under government investigation are turning on their employees to win
leniency for themselves).
159 See Arlen, supra note 134, at 833.
160 Cf. Jon J. Lambiras, White-Collar Crime: Why the Sentencing Disparity Despite Uniform
Guidelines?, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 459 (2003) (noting the wide sentencing difference among jurisdictions
in financial crime cases).
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corporation are caught in such cases can be random.16 1 There can be no doubt that
corporations will try to do this.
162
The prosecutor's zest for forcing cooperation in financial fraud cases also
took an unusual twist in the prosecution of, Martha Stewart. Included in the
Stewart indictment are charges of securities fraud based on her public declarations
of innocence to charges of insider trading. 63 By declaring her innocence ofinsider
trading in an independent company she allegedly affected the value of the stock in
her namesake company; that is, she misled her own shareholders. In other words,
a claim of innocence by a high profile CEO in a matter unrelated to the company's
business has now become securities fraud if the government does not believe the
CEO's story. This is taking failure to cooperate with prosecutors to a new level.
The tactic raises novel legal and moral questions,164 but academic debate aside, the
threat of the charge undoubtedly substantially increases the potential downside risk
of any claim of innocence by a high profile CEO. Prosecutors unwittingly were
ignorant of a necessary subtlety of securities law long understood by the courts in
161 Senior officials who make the decision for the corporation to cooperate and frnd a scapegoat
may themselves be seeking to avoid prosecution. It is a classic agency problem.
162 Consider the comments of Eric Holder, the author of the Holder Memorandum, discussed
supra note 38:
Montagne: How did the corporations react to your memo at the time, back in
1999, and are their CEOs and boards more supportive of it now than they were
when you first wrote it?
Holder: ... I think that when it came out, I think corporations probably didn't
think it was the best idea in the world, because we were trying to force
prosecutors to consider indicting corporations. Now I think in some ways it's
being used as a shield, where corporations are under a greater scrutiny and are
holding up the memorandum and saying, "Well, you know, if you apply these
factors, we should not be indicted as a corporation." So I think the reaction to
it has been mixed.
163 See the sources cited supra note 35.
164 See Mills & Weisberg, supra note 35, at A10:
How did the CEO's claim of innocence threaten that value? Wouldn't the
stock value suffer more if she confessed guilt and resigned? And how did the
CEO financially gain from the statement-other than in the trivially obvious
sense that she avoids financial loss she would suffer if she confessed guilt?...
Even if prosecutors could somehow finesse the victim/loss issue.... It seems
bizarre to charge a person with fraud when all she does is publicly proclaim her
innocence under a system of justice which [sic] requires the state to prove guilt,
and which [sic] allows defendants to maintain their innocence. After all, a
proclamation of innocence, even if it contains a false assertion, is the natural
way for a charged person to put the state to its proof.
The authors' claim that there are no shareholder victims is questionable. Anytime
stock values do not match firm fundamentals because there is false public information
affecting stock prices, there are losers. In this case those who bought the stock during the
time period affected by the public denials could be called losers. A better argument
would be that the market price was not affected materially by the denial. In any event,
the authors' argument on moral problems deserves careful attention.
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deciding Rule 1Ob-5 cases, that not all acts that affect stock price should be
actionable.
165
In the end, the success of the partnership or cooperation paradigm is in the
hands of our public prosecutors. Those who have faith in prosecutors claimthat
prosecutors can reap its benefits and avoidits dangers: prosecutors understand the
scapegoating phenomenon and will not bring such cases. We shall see. 166 Even
proponents, however, must acknowledge that the approach maximizes prosecutors'
power and attendant responsibility.
Yet what system controls the accountability of the prosecutors? Not courts,
who rarely see or otherwise get to rule on the results of companies' capitulation to
prosecutors' demands. 167  If we are content to give prosecutors this kind of
discretionary power to threaten companies with liquidation, which is, in effect,
unrestrained by judges or juries, we will have to rely solely on an effective system
of professional disciplinary review to catch and deter abuses. As an admitted
outsider looking in, I doubt we have such effective systems in place.
Any self-policing disciplinary system operates inside whatever is the
professional culture. At the moment, the culture of prosecutors is to seek and use a
broad arsenal of weapons against suspected wrongdoers. 168 There seems to be a
165 See, e.g., Lewis v. Chrysler Co., 949 F.2d .644 (3d Cir. 1991) (federal securities law
disclosure requirements do not require senior executives to publicly admit the culpability of their
actions).
166 See, e.g., Ann Davis, Enron Heat Descends on Smaller Players; Other Enjoy Shade, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 1, 2003, at C1 (the article describes the prosecution of James A. Brown, a finance
specialist at Merrill Lynch & Co., for his role in the Enron scandal). The description has the strong
odor of a scapegoat prosecution; he allegedly approved, after initial objections, a "Nigerian barge
investment" for Merrill in which the investment bank contributed a measly $7 million, small
potatoes. Brown is charged with, you guessed it, perjury and obstruction of justice, in addition to
criminal conspiracy. See Hudson, supra note 20, at C8 (discussing the criminal trial of four
executives of Qwest for overstated revenues claimed on a single transaction with the Arizona School
Facilities Board).
167 This is the critical difference between an approach that rests on leniency in sentencing and
leniency in the decision to prosecute. In theory, judges control sentencing decisions; prosecutors, on
the other hand, control the decision to prosecute.
1 6 Discussing the development of mail and wire fraud prosecutions for business crimes, Judge
Ralph Winter has noted:
In any event, courts acceded to the desire of prosecutors for the creation of
amorphous crimes that would allow prosecutors to pursue hard-to-define
improprieties-or conduct that was improper only in the eyes of the particular
prosecutor-or to pressure individuals thought to possess knowledge of other
criminal activities. The creation of these crimes by the federal courts was not, I
believe, an unconscious act. Rather, it was in part an act of faith and in part a
desire to avoid seeming acquiescence in corrupt conduct. The act of faith was
the belief that the effect of the unbounded doctrines they were creating would
always be tempered by a prudential exercise of prosecutorial discretion ....
The culture of prosecutors in these areas of law is' to seek rules that are
palpably overbroad so that they have a broad arsenal of weapons to use against
suspected wrongdoers.... They understandably believe that they can be trusted
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relentless drive within the profession to increase the discretionary power of
individual prosecutors. 69 And one must have a theory of how prosecutors will
exercise this newfound power before one can be happy with current trends. 7 ° I
hold the view that even if properly exercised for a while, and we are happy seeing
some deserving CEOs go to jail, that over time the lack of accountability and
control on prosecutors in financial scandal cases may spell serious problems.
Judge Ralph Winter, an astute and well-positioned observer of prosecutorial
conduct and culture has noted, for example:
[U]nchecked power-and it is enormous, raw power-is very
troubling in a democratic society. Even if prosecutors are an
unusually fair-minded segment of society, at least isolated
prosecutorial abuses are inevitable. In busy offices, individual
prosecutors may be relatively unsupervised. Moreover, federal
prosecutors are trained to be trial lawyers who can get
convictions and may be entirely ignorant of the working of
capital markets. As well, as demonstrated in the
Princeton/Newport Partners case, the Department of Justice may
not be able to control individual prosecutorial decisions.'17
to limit the application of overbroad doctrine to those who truly are
wrongdoers.
Winter, supra note 19, at 956-57.
169 Id. at 965.
170 See the theory of one-time white collar defense lawyer, now federal district court judge, Jed
S. Rakoff: "[P]rosecutors are reluctant to bring the criminal law to bear against organizations that
appear more rueful than recalcitrant. Simply put, prosecutors tend to view themselves as avenging
angels in simple morality plays where evil is banished and social order restored." Jed S. Rakoff,
Four Postulates of White-Collar Practice, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 12, 1993, at 3. Not a bad theory.
171 Winter, supra note 19, at 963. In the Princeton/Newport Partners case the government sought
pre-trial restraint and forfeiture under RICO of the assets of a small investment partnership to
pressure the partners into testifying against partners in an investment bank, Drexel Burnham and
Lambert. Nervous investors withdrew their capital from the partnership and forced its liquidation.
See David A. Vise, RICO Goes to Wall St., Racketeer Law's Impact Felt Even Before Verdict in First
Case, WASH. POST, July 30, 1989, at HI. The charges against the partnership did not, under the
Department of Justice guidelines, justify the use of RICO. On appeal, the United States Attorney's
Office in the Southern District of New York argued that the Department of Justice guidelines were
not binding and were wrong. See United States v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir.), amended 946
F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1991). One can take issue with Judge Winter's conclusion that increased
prosecutorial discretion has raised the cost of capital in the United States. Winter, supra note 19, at
965, 976-77. At the time of the this writing, the amount of corporate fraud now disclosed has shaken
the country's capital markets and clearly had a depressing effect on stock prices. One can reasonably
believe (as I do), in opposition to the view of Judge Winter, that prosecutors' reinvigorated efforts to
hold some accountable for corporate fraud, sobering up those still in office, will have a positive long
run effect on the cost of capital in the United States.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is still early, but there are already lessons from the prosecutions of the 2002
scandals. First, public pressure for fast, splashy results has encouraged sideshow
(collateral and technical) prosecutions of high profile personalities and firms.
Second, state attorneys general have a significant and important role to play in
policing national financial scandals. Third, prosecutors are supplementing or even
supplanting criminal prosecutions with easier-to-win civil prosecutions; but the
civil prosecutions carry with them the problem of potential fine shifting and
avoidance by defendants. And fourth, the tough prosecutor's tactic of coercing the
assistance of financial institutions in prosecutions of their employees by
threatening indictment of the institutions themselves puts a premium on measured
judgments by prosecutors, judgments that may be unreviewed or unreviewable by
courts or other supervising authorities. As we have discovered in our securities
trading markets, any system that relies too heavily on private institutions' self-
policing, with the government as an overseer, is too prone to abuse.
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Addendum
After the editors of the Journal finalized the article, a jury convicted Martha
Stewart on four counts, all involving obstruction of justice. 172  Before the jury
retired, the judge had thrown out the prosecutors' novel charge of financial fraud
on her own company's shareholders based on her public claims of innocence. The
charges thus turned at that moment into a paradigm sideshow prosecution. She
was not convicted of insider trading or any other form of financial fraud. Rather,
she was convicted of lying about her actions to federal officials. Whether the
actions that she lied about were illegal was not determined and not in issue. The
tangential nature of the convictions was not lost on many observers. In a letter to
the editor of the New York Times, Skip Perry of Atlanta wrote: "I'm no legal
expert, but that means she was found guilty of covering up crimes that the
government couldn't prove she committed. This is justice?"'173
The irony of the conviction is that Ms. Stewart engaged in the conduct for
which she was primarily convicted, lying to SEC officials, while she had the
country's highest paid attorneys-partners at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Krantz,
whose average partnership draw per year per partner is close to $3 million-at her
elbow.
A day before going to press, the judge declared a mistrial in the prosecution of
two former Tyco International executives, Chief Executive L. Dennis Kozlowski
and Chief Financial Officer Mark Swartz. The two were charged with taking over
$600 million in cash from firm coffers, all without authorization of the Tyco
Board. The trial lasted close to seven months. There were forty-seven witnesses,
many of them testifying on complex accounting and financial matters. One juror
said it was "like watching paint dry." A well-publicized jury deadlock was
dissolving just as the judge declared a mistrial; one 79-year-old juror, the apparent
holdout, had received a threatening letter after her name was published in the
national press. Prosecutors vow to try the case again.
Also of interest is the prosecution of four former executives of Qwest
Communications in Denver. In the closing arguments, their attorneys claimed that
the men were being sacrificed to protect the higher-ups.
172 See Kara Scannell & Matthew Rose, In Stewart Case, Reluctant Jurors Found Guilt After
'Foolish Mistake', WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2004, at Al. Specifically, she was convicted of two counts
of making false statements to government investigators, one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice,
and one count of obstructing justice. The jury "felt that she was a smart lady who made a dumb
mistake." Id. at A6.
173 Letter to the Editor from Skip Perry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at A26.
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